Assault Article 4 — Rare-Tail Quick Reference
Va. Code §§ 18.2-51.3 through 18.2-57.4 — Verify & Triage
1. Intoxication Maiming
| Offense | Statute | Grade / Range |
|---|---|---|
| DUI maiming — serious bodily injury to another person while DUI | § 18.2-51.4(A) | Class 6 felony — VERIFY |
| DUI maiming — permanent and significant impairment (aggravated) | § 18.2-51.4(B) | Class 4 felony — VERIFY |
| Watercraft DUI maiming — serious bodily injury while operating watercraft under the influence | § 18.2-51.5 | Class 6 / Class 4 — VERIFY |
§ 18.2-51.4(E) defines 'serious bodily injury' for purposes of this section — confirm current statutory definition. VERIFY all grades before charging.
2. Substance, Explosive & Biological / Radiological
| Offense | Statute | Grade / Range |
|---|---|---|
| Bodily injury by caustic substance, explosive, or fire — malicious | § 18.2-52 | Felony: 5–30 years |
| Bodily injury by caustic substance, explosive, or fire — unlawful | § 18.2-52 | Class 6 felony |
| Bodily injury by infectious substances / radiological agents | § 18.2-52.1 | Felony — tiered — VERIFY |
| Attempts to poison | § 18.2-54.1 | Felony — VERIFY |
| Adulteration of food, drink, drugs, cosmetics, etc. | § 18.2-54.2 | Felony — VERIFY |
3. Reckless Endangerment & Animal Attack
| Offense | Statute | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| Throwing objects from elevated position at occupied vehicle or person | § 18.2-51.3 | Class 6 felony |
| Animal attack causing serious injury — owner liability | § 18.2-52.2 | Felony — VERIFY |
| Reckless handling of a firearm — base | § 18.2-56.1 | Class 1 misdemeanor |
| Allowing a child access to a firearm | § 18.2-56.2 | Class 1 misdemeanor — VERIFY grade change |
4. Status- and Context-Specific
| Offense | Statute | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| Female genital mutilation — any theory | § 18.2-51.7 | Class 2 felony |
| Bodily injuries by prisoners — tiered based on circumstances | § 18.2-55 | Felony — tiered — VERIFY |
| Hazing of youth-gang initiation members | § 18.2-55.1 | Class 1 misdemeanor |
| Hazing at schools or colleges | § 18.2-56 | Class 1 misdemeanor |
5. Administrative / Non-Charging Provisions
- § 18.2-54 — conviction of lesser offenses: permits conviction on any lesser offense necessarily included in a charged assault/wounding; see the cross-cutting defenses cheatsheet
- § 18.2-57.3 — first-offender domestic deferral: a deferral/dismissal mechanism for qualifying first-time domestic assault offenders; see the domestic assault cheatsheet
- § 18.2-57.4 — military family-advocacy reporting: administrative reporting obligation; non-charging provision
- § 18.2-57.1 — REPEALED: no longer in effect; do not cite
6. Annotated Authority
Annotated authority — research layer, not printed on the PDF
Bristol v. Commonwealth (Supreme Court — CONTROLLING) 272 Va. 568, 636 S.E.2d 460, Va., 2006
THE LAW: "the arrest MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE the driver may be required to take the test. Thus, based on this statutory language, a driver's MERE AGREEMENT TO TAKE A BREATH OR BLOOD TEST CANNOT CONSTITUTE A FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT OF THE DRIVER'S ARREST." Accordingly "Bristol WAS NOT ARRESTED WITHIN THREE HOURS of the offenses as required by the implied consent provisions of Code § 18.2-268.2. Therefore, THE CERTIFICATE OF BLOOD ANALYSIS obtained pursuant to that statute WAS INADMISSIBLE at trial." A DISSENT would have affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Practical value: ⚠️ THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT PRACTICE POINT ON THIS SHEET. In a § 18.2-51.4 prosecution the blood certificate usually IS the case, and it stands or falls on a completed arrest WITHIN THREE HOURS. Consent to the test does not supply the arrest. Fix the moment of arrest on the record — words used, restraint applied, time noted — before anyone reads the implied-consent statute.
Bristol v. Commonwealth (panel — STAYED, then vindicated) 45 Va. App. 534, 612 S.E.2d 244, Va. Ct. App., 2005
A panel REVERSED the convictions, "holding that the certificate of analysis had been improperly admitted into evidence because Bristol HAD NOT BEEN ARRESTED WITHIN THREE HOURS of the offenses as required by Code § 18.2-268.2(A)." ⚠️ The Court of Appeals then GRANTED the Commonwealth's petition for rehearing en banc and STAYED this decision, 45 Va. App. 673 (2005) — so this mandate never took effect. The Supreme Court ultimately reached the SAME RESULT on the same ground.
Practical value: ⚠️ CITE 272 Va. 568, NOT THIS. The reasoning here was vindicated, but the mandate was stayed and then superseded by an en banc decision going the other way. A citation to 45 Va. App. 534 alone tells a reader nothing about which of three outcomes survived.
Bristol v. Commonwealth (en banc — REVERSED) 47 Va. App. 584, 625 S.E.2d 676, Va. Ct. App. (en banc), 2006
⚠️ REVERSED BY THE SUPREME COURT — recorded so it is not cited as though it stood. On rehearing en banc the Court of Appeals held "that the circuit court PROPERLY ADMITTED the certificate of analysis because Bristol WAS UNDER ARREST WITHIN THREE HOURS of the offenses AS A RESULT OF SUBMITTING to a police officer's" request. That is precisely the reasoning the Supreme Court rejected.
Practical value: This is the citation that appears to help the Commonwealth and does not. Its central proposition — that submitting to the test can supply the arrest — is the one holding the Supreme Court expressly disapproved.
Rich v. Commonwealth 292 Va. 791, 793 S.E.2d 798, Va., 2016
AFFIRMED. DUI maiming under § 18.2-51.4 requires CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE, satisfied by "A RECKLESS OR INDIFFERENT DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS". Rich leaned over in the driver's seat so her boyfriend could light her cigarette and struck a man crossing the street in a motorised scooter. Her "ADMITTED INATTENTIVENESS while driving, VOLUNTARY CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL up to and well beyond the point of intoxication, and voluntary decision to drive" supported the finding. On CAUSATION, the victim's own intoxication while operating his wheelchair was NOT an independent, intervening act — another driver testified she had seen him in time under similar conditions.
Practical value: THE TWO ELEMENTS THAT ACTUALLY GET LITIGATED ON THIS STATUTE, and Rich addresses both. On negligence, the combination is what carries it — inattention PLUS drinking PLUS the decision to drive. On causation, a victim's own impairment is not automatically a superseding cause; the answer is evidence that a sober driver would have seen him.
Coomer v. Commonwealth 67 Va. App. 537, 797 S.E.2d 787, Va. Ct. App., 2017
Applies Rich outside § 18.2-51.4, noting that "[w]hile not felony child neglect, DUI MAIMING ALSO REQUIRES A FINDING OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE", and citing Wood, where a mother with a BAC of .22 who was also under the influence of Ambien had her felony child-neglect conviction affirmed: "We UNDERSCORE at this point appellant's HIGH LEVEL OF INTOXICATION. THIS ALONE JUSTIFIES A FINDING OF GROSS, WANTON, AND CULPABLE CONDUCT."
Practical value: THE INTOXICATION-ALONE POINT IS THE USEFUL ONE: a high enough BAC can carry the negligence element without more. Read with Rich, which reaches the same place by combination — so run both theories where the BAC is high. ⚠️ Coomer is a FELONY CHILD NEGLECT case; § 18.2-51.4 appears in it by analogy. And it quotes STEVENS, 272 Va. 481 (2006) — the Supreme Court decision in the same litigation as the Stevens en banc opinion annotated below.
Stevens v. Commonwealth (en banc) 46 Va. App. 234, 616 S.E.2d 754, Va. Ct. App. (en banc), 2005
On rehearing en banc the judgment of the trial court was AFFIRMED, the panel's stayed mandate (44 Va. App. 122) being lifted. The useful holding is evidentiary: Code § 18.2-267(E) "applies to BAR INTRODUCTION OF THE RESULTS OF THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS because a prosecution under Code § 18.2-36.1 includes as an element of the offense proof of violation of Code § 18.2-266." The court also noted that § 18.2-51.4 "specifically provides that the implied consent law provisions apply upon arrest for a violation of that code section."
Practical value: ⚠️ THE PRELIMINARY BREATH TEST IS NOT EVIDENCE. Where the charge necessarily includes proof of a § 18.2-266 violation — and § 18.2-51.4 does — the PBT result is barred. Use it for probable cause and leave it out of the case-in-chief. ⚠️ POSTURE: a DIVIDED PANEL decision at 44 Va. App. 122 was stayed and superseded by this en banc opinion, and the same litigation later produced STEVENS, 272 Va. 481 (2006), in the Supreme Court, which this project has NOT retrieved. Check the Supreme Court decision before relying on the en banc reasoning.
⚠️ This sheet previously cited NO case law — confirmed by a RECURSIVE walk. Sourced from scratch on 2026-09-04. ⚠️ BRISTOL HAS A FOUR-STAGE HISTORY WITH THREE DIFFERENT RESULTS. Read all three Bristol entries before citing any of them.