Indecent Liberties & Non-Contact Child Sex Offenses
Va. Code §§ 18.2-370, 18.2-370.01, 18.2-370.1, 18.2-370.6, and 18.2-371(ii)
1. Charges at a Glance
| Statute | Conduct | Grade | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| § 18.2-370(A) | Adult 18+, with lascivious intent, knowingly and intentionally commits one of five enumerated acts (exposure / proposing exposure / proposing fondling / proposing sex acts / enticing into a place) with a child under 15 | Class 5 felony | Five subdivisions A(1)–A(5); each is a separate prosecutable theory |
| § 18.2-370(B) | Adult 18+, with lascivious intent, knowingly receives money/property/remuneration for allowing, encouraging, or enticing person under 18 to perform in or be a subject of sexually explicit visual material; or encourages such person | Class 5 felony | Cross-reference § 18.2-374.1 et seq. (child pornography) for the underlying-material offenses |
| § 18.2-370(D) — under-15 victim | Parent, step-parent, grandparent, or step-grandparent commits § 18.2-370 conduct on his child/step-child/grandchild/step-grandchild under 15 | Class 4 felony | Enhanced grade for the same conduct |
| § 18.2-370(D) — 15-to-17 victim | Same defendant categories commit § 18.2-370 conduct or § 18.2-370.1(A)(v)/(vi) conduct on his 15–17 y/o child/step-child/grandchild/step-grandchild | Class 5 felony | Reaches conduct otherwise outside § 18.2-370 because of the under-15 cutoff |
| § 18.2-370.01 | Child 13–17, with lascivious intent, knowingly and intentionally exposes self to (or proposes that) any other child under 14 who is 5+ years junior (measured by actual DOB) | Class 1 misdemeanor | The juvenile-defendant variant of § 18.2-370(A)(1) |
| § 18.2-370.1(A) | Adult 18+, except as provided in § 18.2-370, maintaining a custodial or supervisory relationship over a child under 18 (not legally married to the child and the child is not emancipated), with lascivious intent, knowingly and intentionally commits one of six enumerated acts (i–vi) | Class 6 felony | Six subdivisions; (vi) is sexual abuse as defined in § 18.2-67.10(6) — bridge to sexual battery |
| § 18.2-370.1(B) | Second or subsequent conviction of § 18.2-370.1 | Class 5 felony | Verify second-offense pleading requirements |
| § 18.2-370.6 | Adult, with lascivious intent, intentionally penetrates the mouth of a child under 13 with his or her tongue | Class 6 felony | Confirm current text; targets conduct outside the forcible-sodomy elements |
| § 18.2-371(ii) | Adult 18+ engages in consensual sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anilingus with or by a child 15 or older not his spouse, child, or grandchild | Class 1 misdemeanor | The residual misdemeanor for non-coerced adult-with-15-to-17-y/o sex |
§ 18.2-370 and § 18.2-370.1 cover different conduct universes: § 18.2-370 reaches any adult 18+ with a victim under 15; § 18.2-370.1 reaches any adult 18+ with a custodial or supervisory relationship over a victim under 18. The "except as provided in § 18.2-370" clause means custodial cases against children under 15 go under § 18.2-370, not § 18.2-370.1. § 18.2-371(ii) is frequently the residual charge when the victim is 15–17 and no aggravator applies.
Registry-Related Companion Provisions (cross-reference only)
| Statute | What it does |
|---|---|
| § 18.2-370.2 | Sex offenses prohibiting proximity to children — registered offender may not loiter within 100 feet of premises where children congregate |
| § 18.2-370.3 | Prohibits residing within 500 feet of certain child-serving facilities for enumerated registrants |
| § 18.2-370.4 | Prohibits working on school property for certain registrants |
| § 18.2-370.5 | Offenses prohibiting entry onto school or other property without permission |
These are post-conviction restrictions, not charging statutes per se. Track them in plea and sentencing colloquies; violations are separately prosecutable.
2. Elements You Must Prove
A. § 18.2-370(A) — Taking Indecent Liberties With Children
- The defendant was 18 or older at the time of the act.
- The defendant acted with lascivious intent (§ 4.1 below for definition and proof framework).
- The defendant knowingly and intentionally committed one of the following acts.
- The complaining witness was a child under 15 at the time of the act.
Subdivision (A) acts (element 3)
- (A)(1) Exposes his or her sexual or genital parts to any child to whom he is not legally married, OR proposes that the child expose his or her sexual or genital parts to him.
- (A)(2) [Repealed by Acts 2014, c. 794 — confirm current numbering before relying.]
- (A)(3) Proposes that the child feel or fondle his or her own or the defendant's sexual or genital parts, OR proposes that the defendant feel or fondle the child's sexual or genital parts.
- (A)(4) Proposes to the child the performance of an act of sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anilingus, or any act constituting an offense under § 18.2-361.
- (A)(5) Entices, allures, persuades, or invites the child to enter any vehicle, room, house, or other place, for any of the purposes set forth in subdivisions (1)–(4).
B. § 18.2-370(B) — Sexually Explicit Material
- Defendant 18+.
- With lascivious intent.
- Knowingly receives money, property, or any other remuneration for allowing, encouraging, or enticing any person under 18 to perform in or be a subject of sexually explicit visual material, OR knowingly encourages such person to perform.
Grade: Class 5 felony. Cross-reference § 18.2-374.1 et seq.
C. § 18.2-370(D) — Family-Member Enhancement
- Defendant is parent, step-parent, grandparent, or step-grandparent of the complaining witness.
- Defendant commits a violation of § 18.2-370 (any subdivision A) or § 18.2-370.1(A)(v) or (vi).
- Complaining witness is the defendant's child, step-child, grandchild, or step-grandchild.
- Grade follows victim age: Victim under 15 → Class 4 felony; Victim 15–17 → Class 5 felony.
D. § 18.2-370.01 — Juvenile Indecent Exposure
- Accused is a child over 13 but under 18 at the time of the act.
- With lascivious intent.
- Knowingly and intentionally exposes his or her sexual or genital parts to (or proposes such exposure to/by) any other child under 14 who is 5 or more years junior, measured by actual dates of birth.
Grade: Class 1 misdemeanor.
E. § 18.2-370.1(A) — Custodial or Supervisory Indecent Liberties
- Defendant 18 or older.
- Maintains a custodial or supervisory relationship over the complaining witness (§ 4.4 below for case law).
- Complaining witness is under 18.
- Defendant is not legally married to the complaining witness, and the complaining witness is not emancipated.
- With lascivious intent.
- Knowingly and intentionally commits one of six enumerated acts.
Subdivision (A) acts (element 6)
- (i) Proposes that the child feel or fondle the defendant's sexual or genital parts, OR that the defendant feel or handle the child's sexual or genital parts.
- (ii) Proposes to the child the performance of an act of sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anilingus, or any act constituting an offense under § 18.2-361.
- (iii) Exposes his or her sexual or genital parts to the child.
- (iv) Proposes that the child expose his or her sexual or genital parts to the defendant.
- (v) Proposes to the child that the child engage in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or fondling of sexual or genital parts with another person.
- (vi) Sexually abuses the child as defined in § 18.2-67.10(6).
Grade: Class 6 felony. Subdivision (B) elevates to Class 5 for a second or subsequent conviction.
F. § 18.2-371(ii) — Consensual Sex With 15–17 y/o
- Defendant 18 or older.
- Engages in consensual sexual intercourse, anal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anilingus with or performed upon or by the complaining witness.
- Complaining witness is 15 or older at the time of the act.
- Complaining witness is not the defendant's spouse, child, or grandchild.
Grade: Class 1 misdemeanor.
G. § 18.2-371(i) — Contributing to Delinquency / Abuse / Neglect
Clause (i) is separate: willful contribution to acts, omissions, or conditions rendering a child delinquent, in need of services, in need of supervision, or abused or neglected as defined in § 16.1-228. Class 1 misdemeanor. Conduct may be sexual or non-sexual. Outside the central scope of this sheet but worth knowing as a charging alternative when conduct doesn't quite reach a Chapter 8, Article 4 sex offense.
3. Doctrinal Battleground
4.1 "Lascivious Intent" — Definition and Proof
The cornerstone for every offense on this sheet. Defined by the Virginia Supreme Court more than fifty years ago and applied without significant doctrinal modification since.
The intent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as an independent element. McKeon itself reversed a conviction because the conduct — a clothed defendant in his bathrobe asking a 10-year-old neighbor girl to run an errand, then telling her to "turn around" and smiling at her from 35 feet away — did not prove lascivious intent BRD even though some exposure may have occurred.
4.2 The McKeon Four-Factor Framework
Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 300, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005) consolidates and articulates the framework. Four kinds of evidence may prove lascivious intent:
- The defendant was sexually aroused;
- The defendant made gestures toward himself or to the child;
- The defendant made improper remarks to the child; or
- The defendant asked the child to do something wrong.
Examples from the cases
- Viney, 269 Va. at 300 — eye movements directing the child's attention to the defendant's exposed genitals satisfied the gestures-toward-himself factor.
- Holley v. Commonwealth (Va. App. 2002) — defendant's admission to police that he 'had a problem controlling himself' and 'had a problem with exposing himself' supplied lascivious intent in a daycare-adjacent exposure case.
- Mason v. Commonwealth (Va. App. 2006) — photographer-defendant's contemporaneous arousal and her conduct of posing a 13-year-old with a vibrator near the child's genitals satisfied the factors; conviction affirmed despite defense argument the photographs were for the imprisoned husband, not the defendant herself.
4.3 Indecent Exposure — "Reasonable Probability" of Being Seen
For § 18.2-370(A)(1) and § 18.2-370.1(A)(iii), exposure does not require that the child actually saw the defendant's genitals. Siquina v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 694, 698–99, 508 S.E.2d 350, 352–53 (1998): the statute reaches "the intentional display by an adult, with lascivious intent, of his or her genitals in the presence of a child where a reasonable probability exists that they might be seen by that child, regardless of the child's actual perception of such a display."
This adopts the common-law standard from Noblett v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 241, 245, 72 S.E.2d 241, 243–44 (1952): "an indecent exposure must be either in the actual presence and sight of others, or in such a place or under such circumstances that the exhibition is liable to be seen by others."
4.4 "Custodial or Supervisory Relationship" — § 18.2-370.1
The signature element. The Supreme Court of Virginia construed it broadly more than fifty years ago, and the Court of Appeals has expanded the application in a consistent line of cases.
- Foundational authority — Lovisi v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 848 (1972)
- Rejected an overly restrictive definition of custody on the ground that it "would eliminate, among others, teachers, athletic instructors and baby-sitters, all of whom might have temporary custody of children, from the purview of the statute." Controlling Supreme Court statement; every Court of Appeals decision in this line applies it.
- Operative definition — Krampen v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 163 (1999)
- Applies Lovisi; the Supreme Court "rejected limiting the definition of 'custody' to legal custody," instead defining it as "the care and control of a thing or person." Includes those with a temporary custodial relationship. A custodial relationship arises when the supervising adult "exercises care and control over the child, with the care including the responsibility for and the control of the child's safety and well being."
- Temporary relationships count — DeAmicis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 751 (1999), aff'd en banc, 31 Va. App. 437 (2000)
- Defendant counselor/photographer to whom the mother left her teenage daughter for sessions had a "temporary custodial relationship" for the duration of each session. Temporary, shared, even one-off control suffices.
- Conduct outside school setting counts — Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8 (2000)
- Teacher's § 18.2-370.1 conviction affirmed for "unlawful conduct with a student outside of the school environment." The custodial/supervisory relationship of a teacher to a student does not evaporate when the school day ends.
- No specific entrustment required — Guda v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 453 (2004)
- School security officer with authority to issue hall passes had a custodial/supervisory relationship to the 15-year-old student he directed into the boys' locker room. "Code § 18.2-370.1 does not require the specific entrustment of the child to the care of the adult to create a custodial or supervisory relationship." 42 Va. App. at 459. Functional care and control — not formal legal status — is the test.
- Voluntary course of conduct suffices — Snow v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 766 (2000)
- Construing parallel "person responsible for the care of a child" language in § 18.2-371.1: "one may become a person 'responsible for the care of a child' by a voluntary course of conduct and without explicit parental delegation of supervisory responsibility." Guda cited Snow approvingly as parallel reasoning under § 18.2-370.1.
4.5 § 18.2-370 vs. § 18.2-370.1 — Charging Choice
| Victim age | Custodial relationship? | Charge |
|---|---|---|
| Under 15 | No | § 18.2-370 (Class 5 felony) |
| Under 15 | Yes | § 18.2-370 (Class 5 felony) — the custodial relationship doesn't elevate; § 18.2-370 controls |
| Under 15 | Parent/step-parent/grandparent/step-grandparent | § 18.2-370 + § 18.2-370(D) enhancement (Class 4 felony) |
| 15–17 | Custodial / supervisory (non-family) | § 18.2-370.1 (Class 6 felony) |
| 15–17 | Parent/step-parent/grandparent/step-grandparent | § 18.2-370(D) Class 5 felony for § 18.2-370.1(A)(v)/(vi) conduct; § 18.2-371(ii) misdemeanor for consensual sex |
| 15–17 | None — adult stranger or acquaintance, consensual sex | § 18.2-371(ii) (Class 1 misdemeanor) |
| 15–17 | None — adult stranger or acquaintance, conduct under § 18.2-370(A)-style proposals | Gap. Neither § 18.2-370 (under-15 limit) nor § 18.2-370.1 (no custodial relationship) reaches it. Consider § 18.2-374.3 (use of communications systems to facilitate offenses against children), § 18.2-67.5 (attempt where the conduct is preparatory to a forcible offense), or solicitation theories. |
4.6 The "Proposal" vs. "Completed Act" Distinction
Most subdivisions of § 18.2-370 and § 18.2-370.1 criminalize the proposal, not the completed act: § 18.2-370(A)(3) "Propose that any such child feel or fondle..."; § 18.2-370(A)(4) "Propose to such child the performance of..."; § 18.2-370(A)(5) "Entice, allure, persuade, or invite any such child to enter any vehicle..."; § 18.2-370.1(A)(i), (ii), (iv), (v) "Propose..."
This is by design. If the act itself occurred, more serious charges apply: sexual battery (§ 18.2-67.4) for fondling; rape, forcible sodomy, or object sexual penetration (§ 18.2-61, § 18.2-67.1, § 18.2-67.2) for completed intercourse/sodomy; aggravated sexual battery (§ 18.2-67.3) where statutory aggravators are met. § 18.2-370 reaches the preparatory proposal and gives it its own grade and elements.
4.7 Strict Liability on Age — Cross-Reference
The age elements of § 18.2-370 (under 15), § 18.2-370.1 (under 18), and § 18.2-371(ii) (15+ but not spouse/child/grandchild) operate as strict-liability age elements — the defendant's knowledge of the child's age is not a defense, consistent with Virginia's general approach. See the sexual-assault companion sheet for the controlling Virginia case authority framework.
4.8 Mens Rea Cumulative Stack
§ 18.2-370(A) and § 18.2-370.1(A) each require three distinct mental states. Defense will sometimes argue insufficient proof of one, and trial courts and juries can blur them. Plead and prove each separately.
- Lascivious intent (the McKeon state-of-mind element);
- Knowingly (knowledge of the conduct);
- Intentionally (purposeful commission of the conduct).
The lascivious-intent element is usually the contested one; knowing and intentional are typically inferable from the conduct itself.
4. Evidentiary Toolkit
The Article 7 evidentiary toolkit applies to most prosecutions on this sheet by its own terms. Cross-references to the sexual-assault companion sheet section numbers are provided below.
- Rape Shield — § 18.2-67.7 / Va. R. Evid. 2:412
- By its terms applies to "prosecutions under Article 7, Chapter 4 of Title 18.2 ... under clause (iii) or (iv) of § 18.2-48, or under § 18.2-370, § 18.2-370.01, or § 18.2-370.1." Available as a matter of right. See sexual-assault companion sheet § 6.2.
- Similar Crimes Evidence — § 18.2-67.7:1 / Va. R. Evid. 2:413
- Applies to felony sexual offense cases with child victims, which includes felony violations of § 18.2-370 and § 18.2-370.1. 14-day pretrial notice required. See sexual-assault companion sheet § 6.3.
- Closed Preliminary Hearings — § 18.2-67.8
- By its terms applies in "preliminary hearings for offenses charged under this article or under § 18.2-361, § 18.2-366, § 18.2-370 or § 18.2-370.1." Routine ask. See sexual-assault companion sheet § 6.4.
- CCTV Testimony — § 18.2-67.9
- By its terms applies broadly; not limited to Article 7. Available for child victims meeting the age and trauma findings. See sexual-assault companion sheet § 6.5.
- Facility Dog — § 18.2-67.9:1
- Available in any criminal proceeding. See sexual-assault companion sheet § 6.6.
- Recent Complaint — § 19.2-268.2 / Va. R. Evid. 2:803(23)
- By its terms applies in "any prosecution for criminal sexual assault under Article 7 ... a violation of § 18.2-361, § 18.2-366, § 18.2-370 or § 18.2-370.1." Recent-complaint corroboration available. See sexual-assault companion sheet § 6.1.
- Child Hearsay — § 19.2-268.3
- By its terms applies where the offense is one of the enumerated child crimes, which include § 18.2-370 and § 18.2-370.1 expressly. Bista v. Commonwealth (Va. 2024) governs the admissibility framework. See child-sex-offenses companion sheet § 5.1.
5. Common Defenses & Rebuttals
| Defense attack | Prosecution response |
|---|---|
| "Innocent conduct — no lascivious intent." | The McKeon framework asks whether the defendant was sexually aroused, made gestures, made improper remarks, or asked the child to do something wrong. Campbell: one factor suffices. Build the record on the factor(s) supported by the evidence; closing arguments anchor the inference. |
| "The child didn't actually see anything." | Siquina v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 694 (1998) — exposure under § 18.2-370(A)(1) requires only "a reasonable probability" that the child might have seen, not actual perception. Prove the geometry, the child's presence, and the defendant's awareness. |
| "My client didn't have legal custody." | Krampen v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 163, 167–68 (1999) — "custody" under § 18.2-370.1 is not limited to legal custody; it means "the care and control of a thing or person." Functional control is the test, not formal legal status. |
| "The custodial relationship was too brief / one-off / shared with the parent." | DeAmicis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 751 (1999), aff'd en banc, 31 Va. App. 437 (2000) — temporary custodial relationships satisfy the element; the parent's continued involvement does not defeat it. The question is whether, during the relevant period, the defendant had care and control. |
| "No parent specifically entrusted the child to my client's care." | Guda v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 453, 459 (2004) — "Code § 18.2-370.1 does not require the specific entrustment of the child to the care of the adult to create a custodial or supervisory relationship." Functional care and control suffices. Snow v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 766 (2000) — voluntary course of conduct can establish responsibility without explicit parental delegation. |
| "My client's role didn't extend to this setting / outside school hours." | Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8 (2000) — a teacher's custodial relationship to a student extends to conduct outside the school environment; conviction affirmed. The relationship attaches to the role, not the location. |
| "It was just an exchange of words — no completed act." | The proposal is the crime. Most subdivisions of § 18.2-370 and § 18.2-370.1 criminalize the proposal/exposure/enticement, not the completed act. The Commonwealth need not prove the proposed conduct actually occurred. |
| "My client didn't know the victim was under 15 / 18." | Strict liability on the age element. Virginia treats age as a strict-liability element across the sex-offense statutes; mistake of age is not a defense. See sexual-assault companion sheet § 4.4 for the controlling-case research note. |
| "The victim consented." | Consent is immaterial to § 18.2-370 and § 18.2-370.1 — the statutes operate on lascivious intent plus the age and (in § 18.2-370.1) the custodial relationship, regardless of consent. Consent is the gravamen of § 18.2-371(ii) only in the sense that the charge applies where conduct is consensual; the child's consent does not defeat the misdemeanor. |
| "The communication was puffery / not serious / sarcastic." | The lascivious-intent element addresses this — the fact-finder evaluates the defendant's actual state of mind based on the full context (relationship, prior communications, conduct accompanying the words, subsequent actions). |
| "This is just § 18.2-371 contributing to delinquency, not a sex offense." | The "or" between clauses (i) and (ii) of § 18.2-371 — the consensual-sex-with-15+ prong stands on its own and applies regardless of any delinquency contribution. The Commonwealth may charge clause (ii) without needing to prove clause (i) elements. |
| "Constitutional vagueness / overbreadth." | These statutes have been applied without significant facial-constitutional challenge for decades. The "lascivious intent" requirement narrows § 18.2-370 to constitutionally proscribable solicitation/exposure conduct. Holley v. Commonwealth (Va. App. 2002), Mason v. Commonwealth (Va. App. 2006), and numerous other applications affirm the statute as applied. |
6. Pre-Trial Checklist
A. Charging Document
- Correct statute and subdivision identified (§ 18.2-370(A)(1)/(3)/(4)/(5), § 18.2-370.1(A)(i)–(vi), or § 18.2-371(ii))
- If § 18.2-370(D) enhancement sought, family relationship and victim age alleged
- If § 18.2-370.1(B) second-or-subsequent enhancement sought, prior conviction allegations made in compliance with applicable enhancement procedure
- Cross-reference § 18.2-67.5 (attempt), § 18.2-374.1 et seq. (child porn), § 18.2-374.3 (use of communications systems) where conduct supports parallel charges
- Multiple subdivisions pleaded in the alternative where evidence supports
- § 18.2-67.7:1 prior-conviction notice prepared (14 days pretrial) if applicable
- Subsequent-offense enhancement notice (§ 18.2-67.5:2 / § 18.2-67.5:3) prepared if applicable (30 days pretrial)
B. Lascivious Intent — The McKeon Factors
- Sexual arousal — physical evidence (erection observed, ejaculation, defendant's statements)
- Gestures — defendant's body language toward himself or the child, including eye movements directing the child's attention
- Improper remarks — sexualized statements before, during, or after; texts; pretextual-call admissions
- Asking the child to do something wrong — proposal language, instructions, requests
- Defendant's subsequent conduct (flight, false statements, destruction of evidence) for consciousness of guilt
C. Exposure Cases (§ 18.2-370(A)(1) and § 18.2-370.1(A)(iii))
- Scene geometry documented — where defendant was, where child was, line of sight, distance
- Reasonable probability the child might have seen established
- Defendant's awareness of the child's presence established
- Repetition / pattern documented if applicable
D. Custodial/Supervisory Relationship (§ 18.2-370.1)
- Documented relationship — employment records, school records, family-relationship records, daycare licensing, religious-organization rosters
- Person who entrusted the child to the defendant identified and subpoenaed
- Authority over the child documented — could the defendant direct the child's movements, behavior, dress?
- Duration and exclusivity of relationship documented (even brief / shared control suffices — DeAmicis)
- Child's own understanding of who was in charge developed in witness preparation
E. Child Victim — Same Considerations as Sexual Assault Sheet
- § 18.2-67.8 closed prelim motion filed
- § 18.2-67.9 CCTV motion if child qualifies (14 days pretrial, 7 days pre-prelim)
- § 18.2-67.9:1 facility dog motion if applicable
- § 19.2-268.3 child hearsay motion drafted; in camera hearing scheduled
- Recent-complaint witness (§ 19.2-268.2) identified and subpoenaed
- Forensic interviewer subpoenaed if interview was conducted
- Victim advocate notified
F. Forensic and Electronic Evidence
- Electronic communications (text, app messages, social media) preserved; search-warrant returns reviewed
- § 18.2-374.3 (use of communications systems) review for parallel charging
- Sexually-explicit material (if § 18.2-370(B) charged) preserved with proper chain of custody
- Surveillance video / scene photographs preserved
G. Defendant Statements
- Miranda compliance documented
- Defendant's admissions / partial admissions preserved — common in this practice area (Holley's 'problem controlling himself' is the model)
- Custodial-interrogation video preserved
- Pretextual / monitored calls with victim's family considered
H. Rape Shield / Evidentiary Posture (§ 18.2-67.7 Applies)
- Reviewed for anticipated specific-instance defense theory
- Reviewed for anticipated motive-to-fabricate (especially common in custodial-relationship cases — disgruntled family, employment dispute)
- Reviewed for any anticipated Clinebell proffer
- Demand the § 18.2-67.7(C) in camera hearing
I. Sentencing / Registration
- Sex Offender Registry consequences confirmed — felony violations of § 18.2-370 and § 18.2-370.1 trigger registration; misdemeanor § 18.2-371(ii) does not trigger lifetime registration but does carry registration consequences in some circumstances (verify current registry statute)
- § 18.2-370.2 through § 18.2-370.5 post-conviction restrictions confirmed for plea/sentencing colloquy
- Restitution worksheet (counseling, medical) prepared
- No-contact / stay-away conditions drafted
8. Annotated Authority
Annotated authority — research layer, not printed on the PDF
Noblett v. Commonwealth 194 Va. 241, 72 S.E.2d 241, Va., 1952
Indecent exposure standing alone is A MISDEMEANOR AT COMMON LAW — the baseline against which § 18.2-370 is the felony.
Practical value: The distinction McKeon turns on. Exposure alone is the misdemeanor; what makes it a felony is LASCIVIOUS INTENT plus a child, and that intent must be separately proved.
Cooper v. Commonwealth 205 Va. 883, 889-90, 140 S.E.2d 688, 693, Va., 1965
An appellate court may consider a question NOT PROPERLY SAVED below where necessary "TO ATTAIN THE ENDS OF JUSTICE."
Practical value: Cuts against the Commonwealth. A failure to preserve is not always fatal to the defence — McKeon reached sufficiency on this basis and then reversed.
McKeon v. Commonwealth 211 Va. 24, 26-27, 175 S.E.2d 282, 284, Va., 1970
THE DEFINITION, from a case the Commonwealth LOST. "Lascivious" is undefined in the statute and takes its ordinary meaning: it "describes A STATE OF MIND THAT IS EAGER FOR SEXUAL INDULGENCE, DESIROUS OF INCITING TO LUST OR OF INCITING SEXUAL DESIRE AND APPETITE." It is "AS NECESSARY FOR THE COMMONWEALTH TO PROVE THE INTENT AS TO PROVE THE ACT". Conviction REVERSED: exposure plus smiling at a girl 35 feet away, with no evidence of arousal, no gesture toward himself or her, and nothing said, did not prove lascivious intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Practical value: Read the list of what was MISSING in McKeon — arousal, gesture, speech — because that is the checklist for what to prove. Exposure plus proximity to a child is not enough on its own.
Lovisi v. Commonwealth 212 Va. 848, 850-51, 188 S.E.2d 206, 208, Va., 1972
On the meaning of CUSTODY: the word "has been defined generally as '[t]he care and keeping of anything'", and the statute being unambiguous there is no warrant for "LIMITATION OF THE MEANING OF 'CUSTODY' TO LEGAL CUSTODY. To give it such a restrictive definition WOULD ELIMINATE, AMONG OTHERS, TEACHERS, ATHLETIC INSTRUCTORS AND BABY-SITTERS, all of whom might have TEMPORARY custody of children, from the purview of the statute."
Practical value: The foundation of every custodial-relationship case, and the answer to "the parents never formally entrusted her to him". ⚠️ READ THE CAPTION: Lovisi construed former Code § 40-112 (CRUELTY AND INJURIES TO CHILDREN, now § 40.1-103), NOT § 18.2-370.1, and Lovisi's own conviction was REVERSED for a prejudicial instruction that let the jury convict on "employing" where there was no evidence of employment. The custody reasoning is what carries across; the case is not an indecent-liberties conviction.
Campbell v. Commonwealth 227 Va. 196, 313 S.E.2d 402, Va., 1984
"Proof of ANY ONE FACTOR can be sufficient to uphold a conviction" under § 18.2-370 — one McKeon indicator suffices.
Practical value: The counterweight to McKeon. McKeon lists what was absent; Campbell confirms you need not assemble all of it. ⚠️ NAME COLLISION: not the Campbell, 12 Va. App. 476 (1991), on the wounding sheet, nor Campbell, 246 Va. 174, on fraud.
Juares v. Commonwealth 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678, Va. Ct. App., 1997
On appeal the evidence is examined in the light most favourable to the Commonwealth, discarding the accused's conflicting evidence and regarding as true all credible evidence favourable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences from it.
Practical value: The review standard applied in Guda; useful only where the Commonwealth prevailed below.
Moyer v. Commonwealth 33 Va. App. 8, 531 S.E.2d 580 (en banc), Va. Ct. App., 2000
EN BANC, on rehearing after a panel had reversed. Convictions on fourteen counts under § 18.2-370.1 AFFIRMED, holding that BUTTOCKS ARE "SEXUAL PARTS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF § 18.2-370.1, and that seizure of the defendant's personal journals under a search warrant did not require exclusion — any Fourth Amendment defect fell within the GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION. The defendant was an eighth-grade teacher who lived in the student barracks and served as a barracks supervisor.
Practical value: Settles a recurring definitional fight — the statute is not limited to genitalia. Note the procedural history: the panel had REVERSED and was overturned en banc, so a panel citation to the 1999 decision (30 Va. App. 744) is superseded. ⚠️ NAME COLLISION: not Maye, 213 Va. 48, nor Moran, 4 Va. App. 310.
Zimmerman v. Commonwealth 266 Va. 384, 386, 585 S.E.2d 538, 539, Va., 2003
The trial court's judgment "is PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is PLAINLY WRONG OR WITHOUT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT" (Code § 8.01-680).
Practical value: The standard Viney was decided under, and the reason lascivious intent is so hard to overturn on appeal once a fact finder has found it.
Guda v. Commonwealth 42 Va. App. 453, 592 S.E.2d 748, Va. Ct. App., 2004
Conviction AFFIRMED. Guda argued that a custodial relationship under § 18.2-370.1 "REQUIRES THE SPECIFIC ENTRUSTMENT OF THE VICTIM BY HER PARENTS into his care." The Court DISAGREED: a school SECURITY OFFICER exercised "sufficient control and care over the students, including the victim, to create the custodial or supervisory relationship."
Practical value: The most useful custodial case on the sheet, because it answers the argument the defence actually makes. No handover by a parent is needed — control and care in fact are enough, which reaches coaches, bus drivers, security staff and volunteers.
Viney v. Commonwealth 269 Va. 296, 609 S.E.2d 26, Va., 2005
Two § 18.2-370 convictions AFFIRMED on sufficiency of LASCIVIOUS INTENT, applying McKeon's "state of mind that is eager for sexual indulgence, desirous of inciting to lust or of inciting sexual desire and appetite" to a man who exposed himself to two girls, aged thirteen and nine, near a school playground.
Practical value: The modern application, and the one to cite for the proposition that circumstantial indicators suffice. ⚠️ CITATION TRAP: VINEY is 269 Va. 296. RINER is 268 Va. 296 — same page, previous volume, and an ARSON case. Registered in confusableCitations.test.ts; check the volume digit.
Commonwealth v. Bower 264 Va. 41, 563 S.E.2d 736, Va., 2002
REVERSED AND FINAL JUDGMENT. The Court of Appeals had set aside a father's § 18.2-67.2 conviction for animate object sexual penetration of his thirteen-year-old daughter, holding the evidence of INTIMIDATION insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated it: "the testimonial evidence along with the FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP between the defendant and victim, their RELATIVE AGES AND SIZES, and THE IMPROPER TOUCHING THAT PRECEDED THE PENETRATION constitute sufficient proof that the conduct of the defendant INTIMIDATED THE VICTIM IN SUCH A WAY THAT HER WILL WAS OVERCOME." It also rejected the Court of Appeals' alternative ground that the act was accomplished BY SURPRISE: that "is NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD", because the penetration "was preceded by at least five minutes of fondling and continued for almost thirty minutes", and conduct over that period "is INCONSISTENT WITH SURPRISE."
Practical value: ⚠️ THIS SHEET STATED THE REVERSED HOLDING, AND BUILT CHARGING ADVICE ON IT. A callout told prosecutors to "pair with forcible offenses ONLY IF the Sutton intimidation evidence stands on its own" — advice that would decline the forcible count on facts the Supreme Court held sufficient, in a child sexual abuse case. Both the entry and the callout are corrected. WHAT TO TAKE FROM IT: intimidation is proved by a COMBINATION, not by the relationship alone. Put on the relationship, the age and size disparity, AND the conduct surrounding the act — and note that DURATION defeats a surprise defence.
Bower v. Commonwealth (Court of Appeals, REVERSED) 36 Va. App. 382, 389-90, 551 S.E.2d 1, 4-5, Va. Ct. App., 2001
⚠️ REVERSED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA — recorded so it is not cited by mistake. The Court of Appeals held that intimidation "in the context of the criminal sexual assault statutes, including Code § 18.2-67.2, MEANS PUTTING THE VICTIM IN FEAR OF BODILY HARM", that nothing in Bower's conduct "would place his daughter in fear of bodily harm", that the evidence would not support even a "lower standard" of psychological domination, and that the act was "probably accomplished by SURPRISE".
Practical value: This is the defence's brief. Expect all three arguments — fear of bodily harm as the definition, relationship-alone-is-not-enough, and surprise — and answer each with the Supreme Court's opinion at 264 Va. 41.
Sutton v. Commonwealth 228 Va. 654, 663, 324 S.E.2d 665, 670, Va., 1985
THE DEFINITION, given in the rape context but applying across the sexual assault statutes because "the term 'intimidation' is CONSISTENTLY USED throughout" them. Intimidation is "putting a victim IN FEAR OF BODILY HARM by exercising such DOMINATION AND CONTROL of her as to OVERCOME HER MIND AND OVERBEAR HER WILL. Intimidation MAY BE CAUSED BY THE IMPOSITION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE on one who, under the circumstances, is VULNERABLE AND SUSCEPTIBLE to such pressure."
Practical value: The second sentence is the one that wins these cases and the one the Court of Appeals underweighted in Bower — psychological pressure on a vulnerable and susceptible victim IS intimidation. A child alone with a parent is the paradigm.
Holley v. Commonwealth 38 Va. App. 158, 562 S.E.2d 351, Va. Ct. App., 2002
§ 18.2-370 conviction AFFIRMED. The statute is violated by a display, with lascivious intent, "of his or her genitals IN THE PRESENCE OF A CHILD WHERE A REASONABLE PROBABILITY EXISTS THAT THEY MIGHT BE SEEN by that child, REGARDLESS OF THE CHILD'S ACTUAL PERCEPTION of such a display." Holley's admissions to police that he "had a problem controlling himself" and "had a problem with exposing himself", together with exposure toward neighbouring daycare children, supplied the lascivious intent.
Practical value: THE CHILD NEED NOT HAVE SEEN IT. That removes the commonest sufficiency argument in exposure cases and means the proof is about position, sightlines and probability rather than the child's testimony — which also spares the child.
Higginbotham v. Commonwealth 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537, Va., 1975
"Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after conviction, it is our duty to consider it IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE COMMONWEALTH and give it ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES fairly deducible therefrom."
Practical value: The standard Bower applies, and the reason the Supreme Court could reach a different result on the same record. Cite it first in any sufficiency response.