What a Class Actually Means
Va. Code §§ 18.2-10 and 18.2-11 — the punishment behind every class cited on every other sheet
1. Felony Classes — § 18.2-10
§ 18.2-10 — authorized punishments for a felony
| Class | Imprisonment | Fine |
|---|---|---|
| Class 1 | LIFE | Up to $100,000, subject to (g) |
| Class 2 | LIFE, or any term not less than 20 years | Up to $100,000, subject to (g) |
| Class 3 | Not less than 5 nor more than 20 years | Up to $100,000, subject to (g) |
| Class 4 | Not less than 2 nor more than 10 years | Up to $100,000, subject to (g) |
| Class 5 | Not less than 1 nor more than 10 years — OR, in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury, JAIL not more than 12 months | And/or up to $2,500 on the jail alternative |
| Class 6 | Not less than 1 nor more than 5 years — OR, in the same discretion, JAIL not more than 12 months | And/or up to $2,500 on the jail alternative |
Classes 5 and 6 are the only ones with a jail alternative, and the discretion belongs to "the jury or the court trying the case without a jury" — not to the court where a jury tried the case. Note also that the Class 2 MINIMUM and the Class 3 MAXIMUM are the SAME figure — twenty years. The two ranges abut exactly rather than overlapping, so a Class 3 felony at its ceiling carries the same term as a Class 2 at its floor.
The § 18.2-10(g) post-release term
- For a felony committed on or after 1 JULY 2000 the court SHALL impose an additional term On or after 1 January 1995 it was permissive ("may"); from 1 July 2000 it became mandatory ("shall").
- NOT LESS THAN SIX MONTHS NOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS, which SHALL BE SUSPENDED Conditioned on successful completion of a period of probation under § 19.2-295.2 and such other terms as the court requires.
- Two exceptions are written into the same sentence It does not apply where the court orders a SUSPENDED TERM OF CONFINEMENT OF AT LEAST SIX MONTHS, and "such additional term may ONLY be imposed when the sentence includes an ACTIVE TERM of incarceration in a correctional facility."
Subsection (g) closes with the proximity-to-children provision, set out in the alert below.
What § 19.2-295.2 actually does with that suspended term
- The court sets a PERIOD OF PROBATION of not less than six months nor more than three years The suspended additional term from § 18.2-10(g) is conditioned on successfully completing it.
- Failure to complete it proceeds under § 19.2-306 and § 19.2-306.1 i.e. the ordinary revocation machinery, not a self-executing consequence.
Summarised only. § 19.2-295.2 should be read directly before any argument about the post-release term.
2. Misdemeanor Classes — § 18.2-11
§ 18.2-11 — authorized punishments for a misdemeanor
| Class | Confinement | Fine |
|---|---|---|
| Class 1 | Jail not more than 12 months | Up to $2,500 — either or both |
| Class 2 | Jail not more than 6 months | Up to $1,000 — either or both |
| Class 3 | NONE | Up to $500 |
| Class 4 | NONE | Up to $250 |
Classes 3 and 4 are FINE-ONLY — the statute authorises no confinement at all. That is the single most useful fact on this table: a Class 3 or Class 4 misdemeanor cannot produce a jail sentence, so it cannot support an argument built on exposure to custody.
Section 18.2-11 closes with a provision for a misdemeanor offence prohibiting proximity to children as described in subsection A of § 18.2-370.2: the sentencing court is authorised to impose the punishment set out in SUBSECTION B of that section IN ADDITION to any other penalty provided by law. Note that the felony equivalent in § 18.2-10(g) points at that section as a whole, not at subsection B — see § 1. § 18.2-370.2 is not reproduced here.
3. Reading a Class Off Another Sheet
What still has to be looked up separately
- MANDATORY MINIMUMS attached to the individual offence A statute can require a minimum term that the class range does not disclose — § 18.2-53.1 and § 18.2-308.1(C) are examples elsewhere in this corpus. This sheet does not enumerate them.
- The SENTENCING GUIDELINES A wholly different instrument from these statutory ranges, and OUT OF SCOPE here. A guidelines midpoint is not a statutory maximum and the two must never be conflated.
- Whether the offence carries its OWN punishment clause Several Virginia offences are UNCLASSIFIED and state their punishment directly — § 18.2-91 and § 18.2-77(A) both do. For those, § 18.2-10 supplies nothing but the fine cap by cross-reference.
4. Points That Come Up at Sentencing
| Defense attack | Prosecution response |
|---|---|
| It's only a Class 6 felony — he should get a misdemeanor sentence. | The jail alternative in § 18.2-10(f) is discretionary and belongs to the jury, or to the court trying the case WITHOUT a jury. It is an option, not an entitlement, and the penitentiary range of one to five years remains available. |
| The court can just fine him on the Class 4 felony. | It cannot. § 18.2-10(g): except for Classes 5 and 6, the court SHALL impose either imprisonment together with a fine, or imprisonment only. A fine alone is authorised only where the defendant is not a natural person. |
| He'll be eligible for parole eventually. | Not on a Class 1 felony life sentence where he was 18 or older at the time of the offence — no parole, no good conduct allowance, no earned sentence credits, no conditional release under § 53.1-40.01 or § 53.1-40.02. |
| He's facing jail on this Class 3 misdemeanor. | He is not. § 18.2-11(c) authorises a fine of not more than $500 and no confinement. The same is true of Class 4 at $250. |
| The suspended post-release term shouldn't apply. | For a felony committed on or after 1 July 2000 it is mandatory — but only where the sentence includes an ACTIVE term in a correctional facility, and not where the court orders a suspended term of confinement of at least six months. Check both before conceding. |
| The guidelines say the midpoint is lower. | The guidelines are a separate instrument and are not covered on this sheet. They do not alter the statutory range in §§ 18.2-10 and 18.2-11. |
5. Before You Argue a Sentence
- The CLASS confirmed from the offence statute, not from memory
- Whether the offence is UNCLASSIFIED and states its own punishment
- The statutory range read off § 18.2-10 or § 18.2-11
- Any MANDATORY MINIMUM in the offence statute identified separately
- For Classes 5 and 6: whether the jail alternative is available on this posture — jury, or court sitting without a jury
- For Classes 1 to 4: a fine alone NOT proposed, absent a non-natural-person defendant
- For a Class 1 felony life sentence: the defendant's age AT THE OFFENCE, which controls the parole bar
- Post-release suspended term under § 18.2-10(g) considered: offence date, active term, and the six-month suspended-confinement exception
- Guidelines treated as a separate instrument from the statutory range
6. Annotated Authority
Annotated authority — research layer, not printed on the PDF
Grafmuller v. Commonwealth 290 Va. 525, 778 S.E.2d 114, Va., 2015
⚠️ A SENTENCE ABOVE THE CLASS MAXIMUM IS VOID AB INITIO, AND THERE IS NO TIME BAR. Grafmuller received 10 years each on two offences whose statutory maximum was FIVE, and moved for a new sentencing hearing. REVERSED AND REMANDED: "a defendant convicted of a felony has A RIGHT TO BE PRESENT PERSONALLY AT A NEW SENTENCING HEARING at which his or her sentence is modified so as not to exceed the maximum sentence provided by law", and that requirement "APPLIES EQUALLY TO SENTENCES IMPOSED BY A JURY AND SENTENCES IMPOSED BY A JUDGE". The presence of the defendant "would contribute to THE FAIRNESS OF THE PROCESS of correcting his sentence." ⚠️ NOTE THE DELAY THE COURT TOLERATED: in Rawls the motion to vacate came TWELVE YEARS after sentencing; Grafmuller's errors were raised after FIVE.
Practical value: THIS IS WHY THE TABLES ON THIS SHEET MATTER. A sentence over the class maximum is not merely erroneous — it is VOID, it can be attacked years later, and the correction requires a NEW HEARING WITH THE DEFENDANT PRESENT. Check the maximum against the class before the order is entered; it is far cheaper than a resentencing five years on.
Thomas v. Commonwealth 296 Va. 301, 819 S.E.2d 437, Va., 2018
REVERSED AND REMANDED for entry of a new sentencing order. A jury fixed a maximum of SEVEN YEARS; the trial court sentenced Thomas to TEN YEARS WITH THREE SUSPENDED. The Court concluded "the trial court's sentencing order, AS DRAFTED, DOES NOT COMPLY WITH VIRGINIA LAW." AND IT QUOTES THE LIMIT ON THE § 18.2-10(g) TERM: the court may "impose an additional term of not less than six months nor more than three years, which shall be suspended conditioned upon successful completion of a period of post-release supervision pursuant to § 19.2-295.2 . . . HOWEVER, SUCH ADDITIONAL TERM MAY ONLY BE IMPOSED WHEN THE SENTENCE INCLUDES AN ACTIVE TERM OF INCARCERATION IN A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY."
Practical value: ⚠️ THE § 18.2-10(g) TERM IS NOT AVAILABLE ON EVERY SENTENCE. No active time in a correctional facility, no additional suspended term. And a court may not use it to exceed what a JURY fixed — that is what went wrong here. Read with Grafmuller: the remedy in both is a new sentencing order, and in Grafmuller a hearing the defendant must attend.
Rawls v. Commonwealth 278 Va. 213, 215-16, 683 S.E.2d 544, 546, Va., 2009
The case Grafmuller compares itself to: a motion to vacate a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum, brought TWELVE YEARS AFTER IT WAS IMPOSED.
Practical value: The measure of how long a void sentence stays vulnerable. ⚠️ RAWLS' OWN OPINION HAS NOT BEEN READ IN THIS PROJECT — it is recorded as Grafmuller recites it, and is not offered for anything beyond the delay.
Commonwealth v. Holman Rec. No. 230343 (Va. Apr. 4, 2024), Va., 2024
REVERSED AND FINAL JUDGMENT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH. The Court of Appeals had reversed a conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, holding that although Holman "HAD NOT PRESERVED his challenge", the ENDS OF JUSTICE exception to Rule 5A:18 applied. The Supreme Court disagreed: "The APPROBATE AND REPROBATE doctrine PRECLUDES Holman from challenging his conviction . . . . The Court of Appeals ERRED IN HOLDING OTHERWISE." What is true of a waiver under Rule 5A:18, or where counsel expressly withdraws a challenge, "is NO LESS TRUE of a litigant who seeks to approbate and reprobate."
Practical value: ⚠️ READ THE POSTURE — the Court of Appeals decision went the defendant's way and was REVERSED in April 2024. Cite the Supreme Court. THE ANSWER TO AN ENDS-OF-JUSTICE ARGUMENT raised for the first time on appeal by a defendant who took the opposite position below. ⚠️ AND THE DOCTRINE CUTS BOTH WAYS: on the PROBATION-VIOLATIONS sheet, Commonwealth v. Delaune applies the same approbate-reprobate bar AGAINST the Commonwealth, holding the Attorney General to a Commonwealth's Attorney's election. It is not a prosecutor's tool; it is a rule about consistency.
⚠️ This sheet previously cited NO case law — confirmed by a RECURSIVE walk. Sourced from scratch on 2026-09-03. Its content is statutory, so these four entries cover only what the CLASSES DO NOT TELL YOU: what happens when a sentence exceeds the class maximum, and when the § 18.2-10(g) term may be imposed at all.