Sexual Assault — Article 7 Forcible & Non-Consensual Offenses
Va. Code §§ 18.2-61 through 18.2-67.10 — Trial & Preliminary Hearing Cheatsheet
Charges at a Glance
| Statute | Conduct | Class / Penalty | Mandatory Minimum |
|---|---|---|---|
| § 18.2-61 | Rape — sexual intercourse accomplished (i) against will by force/threat/intimidation; (ii) through mental incapacity or physical helplessness; or (iii) with child under 13 | Felony — 5 yrs to life | 25 yrs if victim < 13 and offender 3+ yrs older, committed with abduction (§ 18.2-47/§ 18.2-48), burglary (§ 18.2-89/§ 18.2-90/§ 18.2-91), or aggravated malicious wounding (§ 18.2-51.2); life if victim < 13 and offender 18+ (must be alleged in indictment) |
| § 18.2-67.1 | Forcible sodomy — cunnilingus, fellatio, anilingus, or anal intercourse, same three theories as rape | Felony — 5 yrs to life | Same 25-yr / life enhancements as § 18.2-61 |
| § 18.2-67.2 | Object sexual penetration — animate or inanimate object penetration of labia majora or anus (other than bona fide medical purpose), same three theories | Felony — 5 yrs to life | Same 25-yr / life enhancements as § 18.2-61 |
| § 18.2-67.3 | Aggravated sexual battery — sexual abuse, with statutory aggravator (under-13, mental incapacity, physical helplessness, parent/grandparent of 13–17 y/o, force + 13–14 y/o or serious injury or dangerous weapon, or healthcare-provider/massage-therapist context) | Felony — 1 to 20 yrs + up to $100,000 | None |
| § 18.2-67.4 | Sexual battery — sexual abuse against will by force/threat/intimidation/ruse; or two victims/incidents within 2 yrs without consent; or custodial/authority categories (inmate, probationer/parolee, detainee/arrestee, bail-bondsman context, confidential informant) | Class 1 misdemeanor | None |
| § 18.2-67.4:1 | Infected sexual battery — defendant diagnosed with STI engages in transmission-risk conduct, with intent to transmit, and transmits | Class 6 felony | None |
| § 18.2-67.5(A) | Attempted rape / forcible sodomy / object sexual penetration | Class 4 felony | None |
| § 18.2-67.5(B) | Attempted aggravated sexual battery | Class 6 felony | None |
| § 18.2-67.5(C) | Attempted sexual battery | Class 1 misdemeanor | None |
| § 18.2-67.5:1 | Third-misdemeanor sexual-offense enhancement (within prior 10 yrs, on different dates, of enumerated misdemeanors) | Class 6 felony | None |
| § 18.2-67.5:2 | Subsequent felony sexual assault — enumerated offenses (§ 18.2-63 if adult perpetrator, § 18.2-64.1, § 18.2-67.3, § 18.2-361(B), § 18.2-366, § 18.2-370, § 18.2-370.1, conspiracy); 30-day notice required | Max statutory term, no suspension | Max term |
| § 18.2-67.5:3 | Subsequent violent felony sexual assault (§ 18.2-61, § 18.2-67.1, § 18.2-67.2, § 18.2-48 abduction with intent to defile, conspiracy); 30-day notice required | Life imprisonment, no suspension | Life |
Note on the three rape/sodomy/OSP statutes. They share an identical structure (subdivision A.1/2 elements; § 18.2-61 uses (i)/(ii)/(iii) clauses; the others use A.1/A.2). Plead the precise clause: (i)/A.2 force-threat-intimidation, (ii)/A.2 mental incapacity or physical helplessness, or (iii)/A.1 child under 13. The same evidence often supports multiple clauses; allege in the alternative.
Elements You Must Prove
A. Rape (§ 18.2-61)
Elements — Prove Each BRD
- Sexual intercourse between the defendant and the complaining witness (or causing the complaining witness to engage in sexual intercourse with another person). Penetration, however slight, of the labia is sufficient; emission is not required.
- One of three alternative non-consent theories: Clause (i) — Against the complaining witness's will, by force, threat, or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or another person; or Clause (ii) — Through the use of the complaining witness's mental incapacity or physical helplessness (as defined in § 18.2-67.10); or Clause (iii) — With a child under age 13 as the victim (status offense — non-consent not required; "force" not required).
B. Forcible Sodomy (§ 18.2-67.1)
Elements — Prove Each BRD
- The defendant engaged in cunnilingus, fellatio, anilingus, or anal intercourse with the complaining witness (or caused the complaining witness to engage in such acts with another person); and
- Either the complaining witness was under 13 (subd. A.1), or the act was accomplished against the complaining witness's will by force, threat, or intimidation, or through the use of mental incapacity or physical helplessness (subd. A.2).
C. Object Sexual Penetration (§ 18.2-67.2)
Elements — Prove Each BRD
- The defendant penetrated the labia majora or anus of the complaining witness with an animate or inanimate object (or caused the complaining witness to so penetrate his or her own body, or caused the complaining witness to engage in such acts with another person or with an animal);
- The penetration was other than for a bona fide medical purpose; and
- Either the complaining witness was under 13 (subd. A.1), or the act was accomplished by the same force/threat/intimidation/mental-incapacity/physical-helplessness theories (subd. A.2).
D. Aggravated Sexual Battery (§ 18.2-67.3)
Elements — Prove Each BRD
- The defendant sexually abused the complaining witness as defined in § 18.2-67.10(6); and
- One of the statutory aggravators: (a) complaining witness under 13; (b) through mental incapacity or physical helplessness; (c) parent, step-parent, grandparent, or step-grandparent of a complaining witness 13–17; (d) against the will by force/threat/intimidation and (i) victim 13–14, (ii) serious bodily or mental injury caused, or (iii) dangerous weapon used or threatened; or (e) healthcare-provider/massage-therapist context without express patient consent and outside recognized treatment.
E. Sexual Battery (§ 18.2-67.4)
Elements — Prove Each BRD
- The defendant sexually abused the complaining witness as defined in § 18.2-67.10(6); and
- One of the following: (a) against the will by force, threat, intimidation, or ruse (note: ruse is unique to § 18.2-67.4); (b) more than one complaining witness, or one complaining witness on more than one occasion, within a two-year period, intentionally and without consent; or (c)–(g) a custodial/authority category (inmate, probationer/parolee/pretrial detainee/posttrial offender, person detained or arrested by LEO, person on bail with bondsman, confidential informant).
F. Sexual Abuse — § 18.2-67.10(6) Definition
The cornerstone definition that underlies aggravated sexual battery and sexual battery. Plead and prove every component.
Elements
- An act committed with the intent to sexually molest, arouse, or gratify any person; and
- One of four touching alternatives: the defendant intentionally touches the complaining witness's intimate parts or material directly covering such intimate parts; the defendant forces the complaining witness to touch the defendant's, the witness's own, or another person's intimate parts or material directly covering them; if the complaining witness is under 13, the defendant causes or assists the complaining witness to touch the defendant's, the witness's own, or another person's intimate parts (no force required for under-13 victim); or the defendant forces another person to touch the complaining witness's intimate parts.
"Intimate parts" are the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, or buttocks of any person, or the chest of a child under 15.
G. Attempts (§ 18.2-67.5)
Elements — Prove Each BRD
- Specific intent to commit the underlying offense; and
- A direct, ineffectual act done toward its commission that goes beyond mere preparation.
Grade follows the target offense per § 18.2-67.5(A)/(B)/(C).
Doctrinal Battleground
Force, Threat, or Intimidation — Clause (i) / Subd. A.2
The leading case is Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 324 S.E.2d 665 (1985). The Supreme Court drew sharp distinctions among the three terms: "Threat" = the expression of an intention to do bodily harm (Sutton, 228 Va. at 663). "Intimidation" = putting a victim in fear of bodily harm by exercising such domination and control of her as to overcome her mind and overbear her will. Intimidation may be caused by the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure. Sutton, 228 Va. at 663. Intimidation does not require an express threat. "Force" requires "evidence of some array or show of force in form sufficient to overcome resistance." Sabol v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 9, 16–17, 553 S.E.2d 533 (2001) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 983 (1979)). The fear of bodily harm must derive from some conduct or statement of the accused. Sabol, 37 Va. App. at 18.
§ 18.2-67.6 abolishes the resistance requirement: the Commonwealth need not demonstrate that the complaining witness cried out or physically resisted, though absence of resistance may be considered "when relevant to show that the act alleged was not against the will of the complaining witness."
Mental Incapacity — Clause (ii) / Subd. A.2
Definition (§ 18.2-67.10(3)): "that condition of the complaining witness existing at the time of an offense under this article which prevents the complaining witness from understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act involved in such offense and about which the accused knew or should have known."
The leading case is Molina v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 666, 636 S.E.2d 470 (2006) (Supreme Court of Virginia, affirming 47 Va. App. 338, 624 S.E.2d 83 (2006)). Two holdings worth memorizing: (1) "Mental incapacity" is not limited to permanent conditions. The statutory definition is keyed to a condition "existing at the time of an offense" that "prevents the complaining witness from understanding the nature or consequences of the sexual act"; nothing in the text restricts that to non-transitory conditions. (2) Transitory intoxication can qualify if the "nature and degree of the intoxication has gone beyond the stage of merely reduced inhibition and has reached a point where the victim does not understand 'the nature or consequences of the sexual act.'" In Molina itself, the victim's combination of benzodiazepines, cocaine, sub-therapeutic lithium, and a BAC nearly three times the legal driving limit was sufficient — even the defense's own expert called the combination "deadly."
Followed in Nicholson v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 491, 510, 694 S.E.2d 788 (2010) ("consent without understanding is no consent at all," quoting Molina).
Physical Helplessness — Clause (ii) / Subd. A.2
Definition (§ 18.2-67.10(4)): "unconsciousness or any other condition existing at the time of an offense under this article which otherwise rendered the complaining witness physically unable to communicate an unwillingness to act and about which the accused knew or should have known."
Note the difference from mental incapacity: this is about inability to communicate an unwillingness, not inability to understand. Sleep, unconsciousness, paralysis, and certain drug-induced states all qualify.
Sleep as physical helplessness. Quisque v. Commonwealth, No. 1372-14-4 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016) — UNPUBLISHED — held that sleep can constitute the requisite "physical helplessness" under § 18.2-61(A). The Court of Appeals affirmed where the complaining witness was "asleep" or "half asleep" when the defendant began the assault. ⚠️ It was the DEFENDANT who jumped from a third-floor window to avoid police after being confronted — this sheet formerly attributed that flight to the complaining witness — and his flight, together with his false denials, supported an inference of consciousness of guilt.
Mental Incapacity vs. Physical Helplessness — Drawing the Line
The two prongs are often blurred but legally distinct:
| Prong | Element | Typical fact pattern |
|---|---|---|
| Mental incapacity | Victim cannot understand the nature or consequences of the act | High intoxication (Molina); severe cognitive disability; certain drug states leaving the victim conscious but disoriented |
| Physical helplessness | Victim cannot communicate unwillingness | Sleep; unconsciousness; paralysis; physical restraint; certain incapacitating drug states |
Plead in the alternative when the facts support both. The "knew or should have known" mens rea must be proved either way.
Sexual Abuse Intent — Inferring 'Intent to Sexually Molest, Arouse, or Gratify'
For § 18.2-67.3 and § 18.2-67.4, the gravamen is the intent behind the touching, not the touching itself. Touching of intimate parts in a way that would otherwise be incidental is not sexual abuse unless the intent element is proved. Intent is usually proved circumstantially:
- The nature of the touching (duration, repetition, focus on intimate parts)
- The defendant's contemporaneous statements
- The surrounding circumstances (privacy, prior grooming, the victim's age and the defendant's position)
- Sexualized statements before, during, or after
- Defensive flight, false statements after the fact, and forensic evidence (DNA on intimate parts, recovered clothing) corroborating the contact and its sexual nature
Sufficiency of the Complaining Witness's Testimony
Foundational rule. "[A] conviction for rape and other sexual offenses may be sustained solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim." Wilson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 73, 87, 615 S.E.2d 500 (2005). The complaining witness's testimony alone, if credible, is enough.
The "inherently incredible" limit. The fact-finder's credibility determination controls unless the testimony is "inherently incredible" as a matter of law. Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019). "Testimony may be contradictory or contain inconsistencies without rising to the level of being inherently incredible as a matter of law." Id. "Inconsistent statements by a witness only go to the weight and sufficiency of the testimony, not the competency of the witness." Fordham v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 235, 240, 409 S.E.2d 829 (1991).
Practical posture. Corroboration is not required, but corroborate where you can — physical evidence, prompt outcry, prior consistent statements, defendant statements, SANE/forensic exam findings, DNA, recovered articles, surveillance. Corroboration both insulates against the inherent-incredibility argument and supports the credibility determination the fact-finder must make.
The Article's Evidentiary Toolkit
Recent Complaint — § 19.2-268.2 / Va. R. Evid. 2:803(23)
In any prosecution for Article 7 offenses (or § 18.2-361, § 18.2-366, § 18.2-370, § 18.2-370.1), the fact that the person injured made complaint of the offense recently after commission of the offense is admissible, not as independent evidence of the offense, but for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of the complaining witness. Identify the recent-complaint witness early; subpoena them. The substance of the complaint is not admissible under this provision — only the fact of the complaint.
Rape Shield — § 18.2-67.7 / Va. R. Evid. 2:412
Bars general-reputation or opinion evidence of the complaining witness's unchaste character or prior sexual conduct. Specific-instance evidence is admissible only in three narrow circumstances (subsection A): (1) to provide an alternative explanation for physical evidence introduced by the prosecution (semen, pregnancy, disease, physical injury to intimate parts); (2) evidence of sexual conduct between the complaining witness and the accused offered to rebut force/threat/intimidation/mental-incapacity/ physical-helplessness, if reasonably proximate in time; or (3) to rebut sexual-conduct evidence the prosecution introduced first.
Motive-to-fabricate — subsection B. A defendant may always present evidence "relevant to show that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate the charge against the accused." If that motive evidence relates to past sexual conduct with someone other than the accused, the defense must give pre-introduction written notice generally describing the evidence.
Subsection C — in camera evidentiary hearing. Required before any subsection-A or -B evidence is referenced at preliminary hearing or trial. Demand it.
The Clinebell exception. Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263 (1988) — the defense-side authority every prosecutor in this area must know. The Supreme Court held that prior false statements about sexual conduct are not "prior sexual conduct" within the meaning of § 18.2-67.7, and may be admitted (with a foundational threshold of a "reasonable probability of falsity") to impeach the complaining witness. The threshold is fact-specific: a substantial showing of falsity is required before the evidence is admissible. Anticipate a Clinebell proffer in any case with a complaining witness who has made other sexual-misconduct allegations; demand the in camera hearing under subsection C and contest the foundation.
Similar Crimes in Child Cases — § 18.2-67.7:1 / Va. R. Evid. 2:413
For child-victim felony sexual offenses, prior convictions of other sexual offenses are admissible on any matter to which they are relevant. Notice requirement: 14 days before trial, with the date, court, jurisdiction, and offense of each prior. Subject to Rule 2:403 balancing.
Closed Preliminary Hearings — § 18.2-67.8
Court may exclude all persons except officers of the court and supportive persons. Available on the court's own motion or at the request of the Commonwealth, complaining witness, accused, or counsel. Routine ask in Article 7 prelims, especially for child or vulnerable adult victims.
CCTV Testimony by Child Victims — § 18.2-67.9
Available for victims 14 or younger at the time of the offense and 16 or younger at trial, and witnesses 14 or younger at trial. Apply at least 14 days before trial (7 days before other preliminary proceedings). Findings required: persistent refusal to testify, substantial inability to communicate, or clear-and-convincing expert evidence of moderate emotional trauma that would impair communication if testifying in defendant's presence.
Facility Dogs — § 18.2-67.9:1
Available in any criminal proceeding. Apply at least 14 days before the hearing. Findings: certified facility dog, dog will aid the witness, presence will not interfere with or distract from the testimony.
Depositions of Complaining Witness — § 18.2-67
Available with the consent of the accused first obtained in open court by order of record. Rarely used at trial; can be useful in pretrial preservation of unavailable-witness testimony where the accused consents (e.g., terminally ill witness, child witness anticipated unavailable).
STI Testing — § 18.2-61.1
Commonwealth may request — or shall request upon the complaining witness's request — that the defendant submit to STI testing after arrest (subsection A) and again at any point following indictment/arrest by warrant/service (subsection B). If the defendant refuses or capacity is contested, a § 19.2-183-style probable-cause hearing is required. Results are inadmissible as evidence in any criminal proceeding (subsection E) — confidential to the victim, healthcare provider, and Department of Health surveillance.
Common Defenses & Rebuttals
Common Defenses & Rebuttals
| Defense attack | Prosecution response |
|---|---|
| Consent — "She consented." | (1) Where clause (i)/A.2 force-threat-intimidation is charged, focus on the Sutton intimidation analysis — domination, control, disparity of power, vulnerability. (2) Where clause (ii)/A.2 is charged, consent is legally impossible if mental incapacity or physical helplessness is established (Nicholson v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 491, 510 (2010) — "consent without understanding is no consent at all"). (3) Where clause (iii)/A.1 is charged, consent is irrelevant — under-13 is a status element. |
| Insufficient force — "No physical resistance, no violence." | (1) Sutton — intimidation can be made out without express threat or physical force, through domination/control + vulnerability. (2) § 18.2-67.6 — Commonwealth need not prove that the complaining witness cried out or physically resisted. (3) Marshal the conduct-and-statement record from which fear of bodily harm derives (Sabol). |
| Victim was just drunk, not 'incapacitated.' | Molina, 272 Va. 666, 636 S.E.2d 470 (2006) — mental incapacity covers transitory intoxication where the intoxication "has gone beyond the stage of merely reduced inhibition and has reached a point where the victim does not understand the nature or consequences of the sexual act." Toxicology, behavioral evidence, and the defendant's own observations support the incapacity finding; the defendant's awareness shoulders the "knew or should have known" mens rea. |
| Sleep / unconsciousness is not 'helplessness.' | § 18.2-67.10(4) — physical helplessness is "unconsciousness or any other condition" rendering the complaining witness "physically unable to communicate an unwillingness to act." On its face, sleep meets that standard. (Persuasive: Quisque v. Commonwealth, No. 1372-14-4 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016) (unpublished).) |
| No corroboration — just her word. | Wilson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 73, 87 (2005) — a sex-offense conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness, if credible. Credibility is for the fact-finder; inconsistencies go to weight, not competency. |
| Inconsistent statements / inherent incredibility. | Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019); Fordham v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 235, 240 (1991) — inconsistencies go to weight and sufficiency, not competency. Reserve "inherent incredibility" for testimony that is physically impossible or contradicts known facts, not testimony with ordinary inconsistencies. |
| Prior false accusations — Clinebell proffer. | Demand the § 18.2-67.7(C) in camera hearing. Contest the foundational "reasonable probability of falsity" showing — the defense bears the burden, and a substantial showing is required. Argue that bare prior accusations without independent proof of falsity do not clear the threshold. |
| Marital exemption. | Eliminated. § 18.2-61(A) applies "whether or not [the accused's] spouse." The spouse-counseling/dismissal carve-outs in subsections B and C are sentencing alternatives, not bars to conviction. Poole v. Commonwealth (Va. App. 2021) (sufficiency of spouse-rape conviction affirmed). |
| Penetration not proven. | Penetration of the labia, however slight, suffices for rape; emission not required. For OSP, penetration of the labia majora or anus is the statutory element. SANE examination findings, victim testimony, and any forensic recovery support the element. |
| Insufficient sexual-abuse intent. | Intent to sexually molest, arouse, or gratify is proved circumstantially — nature/duration/repetition of touching, contemporaneous statements, surrounding circumstances, prior grooming, defendant's statements after the fact. The fact-finder draws the inference. |
Pre-Trial Checklist
A. Charging Document
- Correct statute and subsection/clause identified — (i) force/threat/intimidation vs. (ii) mental incapacity / physical helplessness vs. (iii) child under 13
- If charging an under-13 enhancement (25-year or life mandatory minimum), predicate facts alleged in the indictment per § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), or § 18.2-67.2(B) — age, age differential, and the co-conduct (abduction/burglary/aggravated malicious wounding) if relying on the 25-year mandatory; offender age 18+ if relying on the life mandatory
- Alternative theories pleaded where the facts support them
- For aggravated sexual battery, the specific subdivision A aggravator charged
- For sexual battery, the specific subsection alternative (force/threat/intimidation/ruse vs. multi-incident vs. custodial)
- If § 18.2-67.5:2 or § 18.2-67.5:3 subsequent-offense enhancement sought, 30-day pretrial written notice prepared and served
- If § 18.2-67.7:1 prior-conviction evidence to be offered in a child-victim felony case, 14-day notice prepared with date/jurisdiction/offense of each prior conviction and certified copies ready
B. Complaining Witness
- Witness interview complete; statement consistent across interviews
- Recent-complaint witness identified and subpoenaed (§ 19.2-268.2)
- § 18.2-67.8 closed prelim motion considered/filed
- § 18.2-67.9 CCTV motion considered/filed if child victim qualifies — 14 days pretrial (7 days for prelim)
- § 18.2-67.9:1 facility-dog motion considered if applicable
- Witness preparation — anticipated cross on inconsistencies, drug/alcohol use, prior relationship with defendant
- Victim advocate present and notified
- § 18.2-61.1 STI testing initiated if requested by victim (note: results not admissible)
C. Forensic / Physical Evidence
- SANE exam performed; SANE nurse subpoenaed
- Sexual assault kit submitted to DFS; COA received or analyst subpoenaed
- DNA analyst subpoenaed (if buccal swab match)
- Photographs of injuries (initial and follow-up if bruising progressed)
- Crime-scene photographs; recovered articles logged with chain of custody
- Toxicology results (if mental-incapacity-by-intoxication theory)
- Surveillance video preserved and authenticated
D. Defendant Statements / Investigation
- Miranda compliance documented
- Custodial-interrogation video preserved and authenticated
- Pretextual / monitored calls reviewed for admissions
- Search-warrant returns reviewed (electronics, residence)
- Forensic exam of defendant (DNA, injuries consistent with struggle)
- Pre-incident communications preserved (text, social media, app messages)
E. Rape Shield / Evidentiary Posture (§ 18.2-67.7)
- Reviewed for any anticipated subsection-A specific-instance defense theory
- Reviewed for any anticipated subsection-B motive-to-fabricate defense theory
- Reviewed for any anticipated Clinebell prior-false-accusations proffer
- Demand the § 18.2-67.7(C) in camera hearing before introduction at prelim or trial
F. Sentencing / Registration
- Sex Offender Registry consequences confirmed and explained
- Mandatory minimum analysis confirmed (25-yr / life under § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2(B))
- § 17.1-805(C) violent felony status confirmed (rape, forcible sodomy, OSP, and aggravated sexual battery are listed)
- Restitution worksheet (counseling, medical, lost wages) prepared
- No-contact / stay-away conditions drafted for any plea or post-conviction order
9. Annotated Authority
Annotated authority — research layer, not printed on the PDF
Strawderman v. Commonwealth 200 Va. 855, 858, 108 S.E.2d 376, 379, Va., 1959
In substituting the words "SEXUAL INTERCOURSE" for "CARNALLY KNOW", the General Assembly MADE NO CHANGE IN MEANING.
Practical value: Forecloses an argument built on the change of wording, and is why pre-1981 authority on the act itself still reads across.
Bailey v. Commonwealth 82 Va. 107, Va., 1886
Conviction AFFIRMED where intercourse was induced through FEAR OF A PERSON WHOM THE VICTIM WAS ACCUSTOMED TO OBEY — a man standing IN LOCO PARENTIS to his 14-year-old stepdaughter, who forbade his actions but then submitted "WITHOUT FURTHER PROTEST OR ANY OUTCRY OR RESISTANCE".
Practical value: The answer to "she never said no again" and "she never fought back", and it is 140 years old. Sutton cites it to show that even under the NARROWER pre-1981 statute, submission through fear of an authority figure was rape.
Jones v. Commonwealth 219 Va. 983, 986, 252 S.E.2d 370, 372, Va., 1979
Under § 18.2-61 AS IT STOOD BEFORE 1981, it was necessary to prove that the intercourse was against the victim's will "BY FORCE" — there was no threat or intimidation limb.
Practical value: Historical only. Cite it to DATE older authority, never as the current test. A case decided before the 1981 amendment applied a NARROWER statute, so a conviction affirmed then holds a fortiori now — but a reversal then may not survive the amendment.
Snyder v. Commonwealth 220 Va. 792, 796, 263 S.E.2d 55, 57, Va., 1980
The last statement of the pre-1981 rule: proof that the intercourse was against the victim's will "BY FORCE" was required.
Practical value: Paired with Jones as the boundary marker. Sutton cites both to show precisely what the 1981 amendment changed.
Smith v. Commonwealth 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135, Va., 1978
A capital murder following rape. The defendant tendered an instruction requiring the Commonwealth to prove the intercourse was accomplished "BY FORCE AND VIOLENCE". Held: "CODE § 18.2-61 DOES NOT REQUIRE THE COMMONWEALTH TO PROVE VIOLENCE." The trial court correctly amended the instruction to require proof that the act was accomplished "against her will, by force".
Practical value: The answer to a defence instruction that smuggles "violence" into the elements. ⚠️ READ THE DATE. Smith construes the PRE-1981 text, and the wording it approved is NO LONGER the statute. § 18.2-61(A)(i) now reads "against the complaining witness's will, BY FORCE, THREAT OR INTIMIDATION of or against the complaining witness or another person", is gender-neutral, and applies "whether or not his or her spouse". Take Smith's HOLDING, not its instruction.
Sutton v. Commonwealth 228 Va. 654, 663-64, 324 S.E.2d 665, 667-70, Va., 1985
THE LEADING INTIMIDATION CASE, and the bridge from the old statute to the present one. The 1981 amendment (Acts 1981, c. 397) SIGNIFICANTLY ENLARGED the definition of rape from "by force" to "by force, threat or intimidation", the legislative intent being "TO EXPAND THE PARAMETERS OF RAPE". The Court then separated the two new terms: "THREAT means expression of an intention to do bodily harm. INTIMIDATION MAY OCCUR WITHOUT THREATS. Intimidation . . . means PUTTING A VICTIM IN FEAR OF BODILY HARM BY EXERCISING SUCH DOMINATION AND CONTROL OF HER AS TO OVERCOME HER MIND AND OVERBEAR HER WILL. Intimidation may be caused by THE IMPOSITION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE on one who, under the circumstances, is VULNERABLE AND SUSCEPTIBLE to such pressure. SUBMISSION THROUGH FEAR TO SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IS NOT CONSENT." Convictions AFFIRMED on intimidation although the defendant DISPLAYED NO WEAPON AND MADE NO VERBAL THREAT.
Practical value: The single most useful authority on this sheet. It answers "he never threatened her", "there were no injuries" and "she did not resist" in one passage, and supplies the vocabulary for the instruction. The particular victim's vulnerability is PART OF the analysis, not a distraction from it. Note also that the wife was convicted on the same facts — Code § 18.2-18 makes a principal in the second degree or an accessory before the fact punishable as a principal in the first.
Woodard v. Commonwealth 27 Va. App. 405, 499 S.E.2d 557, Va. Ct. App., 1998
THE LIMIT ON SUTTON, and a REVERSAL. A sexual battery conviction under § 18.2-67.4 was reversed because the abuse was NOT accomplished by intimidation: "Nothing in the record proves that Woodard OVERCAME M.S.'s MIND AND OVERBORE HER WILL by employing psychological pressure, threats or fear of bodily harm. He simply GRABBED HER ABRUPTLY. She had time NEITHER TO REFLECT upon his conduct, NOR TO SUBMIT. While the touching was patently non-consensual and outrageously offensive, IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY SURPRISE, NOT BY INTIMIDATION." Remanded for trial on assault and battery.
Practical value: Read before charging intimidation on a grab-and-go touching. Sutton's test requires the will to have been OVERBORNE, which presupposes the victim had time to submit; a sudden grab BYPASSES the will rather than overcoming it, and the offence is assault and battery. ⚠️ TWO TRAPS. (1) This is WOODARD, 27 Va. App. 405 — NOT WOODWARD, 12 Va. App. 118 (1991), the physical-helplessness case noted in Key Authorities above. One letter apart, opposite sides. (2) § 18.2-67.4 was amended in 1997 (1997 Va. Acts ch. 643) to reach sexual battery accomplished by "RUSE", a limb Woodard's January 1997 offence did not engage — check the offence date against the current text before relying on the reversal.
Johnson v. Commonwealth 5 Va. App. 529, 534, 365 S.E.2d 237, 240, Va. Ct. App., 1988
"The 'FORCE' necessary to sustain a charge of SEXUAL BATTERY is 'force' BEYOND THAT NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE TOUCHING."
Practical value: Why a sexual battery charge cannot rest on the touching alone. Absent separate force the case must be built on another statutory means — and Woodard shows surprise is not one of them. ⚠️ NAME COLLISION: not the Johnson, 209 Va. 291 (1968), annotated on the robbery sheet, nor the Johnson, 221 Va. 872, on burglary.
Molina v. Commonwealth 272 Va. 666, 636 S.E.2d 470, Va., 2006
AFFIRMED. "MENTAL INCAPACITY" under § 18.2-67.10(3) is NOT limited to a permanent condition such as retardation: "we hold that the term 'mental incapacity' MAY EXTEND TO A TRANSITORY CIRCUMSTANCE SUCH AS INTOXICATION IF the nature and degree of the intoxication has gone BEYOND THE STAGE OF MERELY REDUCED INHIBITION and has reached a point where the victim DOES NOT UNDERSTAND 'the nature or consequences of the sexual act.'" The CAUSE of the inability to consent is NOT DISPOSITIVE. Molina also reads the section as stating FOUR distinct circumstances, mental incapacity and physical helplessness being separate.
Practical value: The controlling authority for the intoxicated-complainant case, and a theory INDEPENDENT of force, threat or intimidation — plead and instruct on it separately. Note the two limits inside the holding: merely reduced inhibition is not enough, and the accused must have KNOWN OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN of the incapacity.
Clinebell v. Commonwealth 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263, Va., 1988
A LIMIT AGAINST THE COMMONWEALTH, and a REVERSAL. Although a witness's character generally may not be impeached by specific acts of untruthfulness, "in sex offense cases . . . the weight of authority recognizes MORE LIBERAL RULES concerning impeachment of complaining witnesses." A complaining witness MAY BE CROSS-EXAMINED ABOUT PRIOR FALSE ACCUSATIONS, and if she denies them the defence may prove them — admissible BOTH to impeach AND as SUBSTANTIVE evidence that the charged offence did not occur. But such evidence is admissible "ONLY IF a court makes a THRESHOLD DETERMINATION that A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF FALSITY EXISTS."
Practical value: A common ground of reversal in these cases, so litigate the THRESHOLD rather than admissibility in principle. A prior accusation that was merely unprosecuted, or that ended in an acquittal, is not thereby shown to be false — reasonable probability of falsity is a finding the court must actually make.
Quisque v. Commonwealth Rec. No. 1372-14-4, 2016 WL 699115 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016) (unpublished), Va. Ct. App., 2016
Rape conviction AFFIRMED on physical helplessness. The victim was asleep, testified she was "still asleep" and "half asleep" when penetration began, and had been drinking before bed; her husband confirmed she had been asleep some time. "[H]er testimony supports the jury's conclusion that she WAS SLEEPING AND WAS NOT CONSCIOUS when appellant removed her pants and penetrated her." The court rejected the argument that the statute requires the victim be "TOTALLY UNAWARE of what was happening to them."
Practical value: ⚠️ THE FLIGHT WAS THE DEFENDANT'S. After first denying he had entered the room, he JUMPED FROM A THIRD-FLOOR WINDOW to avoid police, then admitted entering, then admitted intercourse. This sheet formerly attributed that flight to the complaining witness. Both the flight and the shifting denials were consciousness of guilt, and they are also what proved the "knew or should have known" element of § 18.2-67.10(4). ⚠️ UNPUBLISHED — persuasive only. Cite WOODWARD for the same rule.
Woodward v. Commonwealth 12 Va. App. 118, 119-21, 402 S.E.2d 244, 244-46, Va. Ct. App., 1991
THE PUBLISHED AUTHORITY, and the one to cite. Conviction upheld: "at the time [appellant] had sexual intercourse with the victim, SHE WAS ASLEEP AND THEREFORE PHYSICALLY HELPLESS." Two sentences do the work: "SLEEP IS NOT AN ALL OR NOTHING CONDITION", and the "physical state of 'sleep' is OF COMMON EXPERIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING TO THE AVERAGE PERSON OR JUROR." The victim had consumed alcohol and cocaine, awoke to "a presence" getting into bed, and did not initially react because she thought it was her boyfriend.
Practical value: "Sleep is not an all or nothing condition" is the answer to the commonest defence on these facts — that she woke, spoke, or moved, so she was not helpless. And because sleep is within common juror experience, no expert is needed. ⚠️ NAME COLLISION, ALREADY FLAGGED ON THIS SHEET: WOODWARD, 12 Va. App. 118, is NOT Woodard, 27 Va. App. 405. This corpus also holds Wood, 149 Va. 401, Wood ex rel. Wood, 255 Va. 85, and Woods, 66 Va. App. 123.
Ricks v. Commonwealth 39 Va. App. 330, 335, 573 S.E.2d 266, 268, Va. Ct. App., 2002
"[A]ny flight at a time when it may be to avoid arrest, prosecution, or confinement TENDS TO SHOW A CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT."
Practical value: ⚠️ NAME COLLISION: this is NOT Ricks, 27 Va. App. 442 (1998), annotated on the weapons-carry sheet for the proposition that the Code does not absolutely prohibit a felon from carrying a knife. Two different Ricks, four volumes apart.
Rollston v. Commonwealth 11 Va. App. 535, 548, 399 S.E.2d 823, 831, Va. Ct. App., 1991
"A defendant's FALSE STATEMENTS are probative to show he is trying to CONCEAL HIS GUILT, and thus are evidence of his guilt."
Practical value: The companion to flight, and usually the stronger of the two because the shifting account is on tape. In Quisque the denials moved from "never entered the room" to "entered but nothing happened" to "intercourse, but by mistake" — each retreat was evidence.