Carrying, Brandishing & Weapons on School Property
Va. Code §§ 18.2-308, 18.2-282, 18.2-308.1 and 18.2-309 — the weapons offences the other sheets don't cover
1. Carrying Concealed — § 18.2-308
The offence is carrying "about his person, HIDDEN FROM COMMON OBSERVATION" one of an enumerated set of weapons. The list is not limited to firearms.
The enumerated weapons
- (i) Any pistol, revolver, or other weapon designed or intended to propel a missile by action of an explosion
- (ii) Dirk, bowie knife, stiletto knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor, sling bow, spring stick, metal knucks, or blackjack
- (iii) Any flailing instrument of two or more rigid parts connected to swing freely — nun chahka, nunchaku, shuriken, fighting chain
- (iv) Any disc with two or more points or pointed blades designed to be thrown — throwing star or oriental dart
- (v) A further catch-all category — read the subsection
A pocket knife is NOT on this list; note the separate treatment of knives under § 18.2-308.1 for school property.
§ 18.2-308 — the two elements
Main v. Commonwealth 20 Va. App. 370, 457 S.E.2d 400 (1995) (en banc) (Rec. 0373-93-2), Court of Appeals of Virginia (published, en banc), 1995
binding
AFFIRMED. A pistol in the defendant's back pocket, with only the handle protruding and that covered by a duffle bag, was concealed: it was "hidden from all except those with an unusual or exceptional opportunity to view it." The en banc court also restates the statutory gloss — a weapon is hidden from common observation "when it is observable but is of such deceptive appearance as to disguise the weapon's true nature." Three judges dissented, so the line is genuinely fact-bound. Reporter cite 20 Va. App. 370.
Pruitt v. Commonwealth Rec. 061701 (Va. Sept. 14, 2007), Supreme Court of Virginia, 2007
binding
REVERSED AND DISMISSED — the charge-killer. Pruitt put a pistol in his vehicle's console compartment and immediately got out of the car. Concealed, certainly; but not "about his person", because it was no longer "so connected with the person as to be readily accessible for use or surprise". The Court accepted that his purpose was simply to keep it out of plain view. Reporter cite 274 Va. 382.
Sutherland v. Commonwealth 109 Va. 834, 835, 65 S.E. 15, Supreme Court of Virginia, 1909
binding
The source of the test: a weapon is "about his person" when it is "so connected with the person as to be readily accessible for use or surprise, if desired." Followed in Schaaf v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 429, 430 (1979) and applied in Pruitt.
Farrakhan v. Commonwealth 273 Va. 177, 182, 639 S.E.2d 227, 230, Supreme Court of Virginia, 2007
binding
§ 18.2-308(A) is an inchoate offence, committed upon concealment — so the offence is complete when the weapon is concealed about the person, whatever happens afterwards.
Main and Pruitt mark the two edges. Where the weapon is on the person, Main makes concealment easy to prove; where it has been put down, stowed or left in a vehicle the defendant has stepped away from, Pruitt is the case to beat and often cannot be.
§ 18.2-308 penalties
| Offence | Class |
|---|---|
| First violation | Class 1 misdemeanor |
| Second violation, or a conviction subsequent to any conviction under a substantially similar county, city or town ordinance | Class 6 felony |
| Third or subsequent violation | Class 5 felony |
Note that a prior under a SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR LOCAL ORDINANCE counts toward the escalation — check local convictions, not just Code ones.
2. Brandishing — § 18.2-282
"It shall be unlawful for any person to point, hold or brandish any firearm or any air or gas operated weapon or any object similar in appearance, WHETHER CAPABLE OF BEING FIRED OR NOT, in such manner as to reasonably induce fear in the mind of another or hold a firearm or any air or gas operated weapon in a public place in such a manner as to reasonably induce fear in the mind of another of being shot or injured."
Three things the text does
- It reaches an OBJECT SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE to a firearm A replica or toy is within the section if the manner induces reasonable fear.
- It applies whether or not the weapon is capable of being fired
- The test is objective — "reasonably induce fear in the mind of another"
§ 18.2-282 — the fear element and the limits of the carve-out
Commonwealth v. Alexander Rec. 991786 (Va. June 9, 2000), Supreme Court of Virginia, 2000
binding
A deadly weapon may NOT be brandished in defence of personal property. REVERSED the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction where the defendant brandished a firearm at a repossession agent. Reporter cite 260 Va. 238.
Morris v. Commonwealth Rec. 032714 (Va. Jan. 14, 2005), Supreme Court of Virginia, 2005
binding
The fear may be for SOMEONE ELSE. AFFIRMED where the victim did not say he feared for himself but "stated unequivocally that he feared for the safety of his wife, and that is sufficient to prove the 'induced fear' element". So a witness who insists he personally was not frightened has not answered the charge. Reporter cite 269 Va. 127.
Morris was also a felon-in-possession case in which a flare gun was held to be a firearm, applying Armstrong, 263 Va. 573, 584 (2002) — under § 18.2-308.2 the instrument need only be "designed, made, and intended to expel a projectile by means of an explosion", and operability is not an element. That point belongs to the felon-in-possession sheet; it is noted here because the same case supplies both holdings.
§ 18.2-282 penalties
| Where | Class |
|---|---|
| Generally | Class 1 misdemeanor |
| Upon any public, private or religious elementary, middle or high school — including buildings and grounds — or upon public property WITHIN 1,000 FEET of such school property | Class 6 felony |
The 1,000-foot zone reaches PUBLIC PROPERTY near a school, not only the school itself. Establish the distance with evidence.
3. Weapons on School Property — § 18.2-308.1
§ 18.2-308.1
| Subsection | Conduct | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| A | Knowingly possesses a stun weapon; a knife (EXCEPT a pocket knife with a folding metal blade of less than three inches); or a weapon designated in § 18.2-308(A) other than a firearm — on school or child day centre property | Class 1 misdemeanor |
| B | Knowingly possesses a FIREARM on that property | Class 6 felony |
| C | Knowingly possesses a firearm WITHIN THE BUILDING and intends to use, or attempts to use, it | Class 6 felony AND a MANDATORY MINIMUM of five years, served CONSECUTIVELY with any other sentence |
The pocket-knife carve-out in subsection A is precise: a folding metal blade of LESS THAN three inches. Measure it.
Where the sections reach
- Property of any child day centre or public, private or religious preschool, elementary, middle or high school — including buildings and grounds
- That portion of any property open to the public and then exclusively used for school-sponsored functions or extracurricular activities
- Further locations are listed in the subsection and are not reproduced here
Subsection D limits the child day centre and private or religious preschool provisions — including to their operating hours. Read it.
5. Defence Attacks & Responses
| Defense attack | Prosecution response |
|---|---|
| The weapon was visible, so it wasn't concealed. | Visibility is not the end of the inquiry. The test is whether it was "hidden from all except those with an unusual or exceptional opportunity to view it" (Main, en banc — a pistol whose handle protruded from a back pocket but was covered by a duffle bag). § 18.2-308 also deems a weapon hidden when it is observable but of such deceptive appearance as to disguise its true nature. |
| He put it in the car and walked away — it wasn't on him. | Take this one seriously — it won in the Supreme Court. Pruitt: the weapon must be "about his person", meaning "so connected with the person as to be readily accessible for use or surprise". A pistol placed in a console the defendant then steps away from is not, and the Supreme Court dismissed the indictment. Build the record on ACCESS — where he was, how far, whether the vehicle was open. |
| He was only protecting his own property. | Alexander forecloses it: a deadly weapon may not be brandished in defence of PERSONAL PROPERTY, and the Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals decision that would have allowed the instruction. |
| The complainant said he wasn't actually afraid for himself. | Not an answer. Morris: fear for another person — there, the witness's wife — is sufficient to prove the induced-fear element. |
| It was a replica — it couldn't fire. | § 18.2-282 reaches an object similar in appearance, whether capable of being fired or not. The element is the manner and the reasonable fear it induces. |
| He was defending himself. | An express statutory carve-out for excusable or justifiable self-defence, so meet it on the facts rather than treating it as a general defence to be weighed. |
| It was just a pocket knife at the school. | The carve-out is a folding METAL blade of LESS THAN three inches. Measure the blade; over three inches and subsection A applies. |
| He was on the sidewalk, not at the school. | For brandishing, § 18.2-282 reaches public property within 1,000 FEET of school property. Prove the distance. |
| The prior was a town ordinance, not a Code violation. | § 18.2-308's escalation counts a conviction under any substantially similar county, city or town ordinance. |
6. Before You Charge
- Right sheet: is this actually a § 18.2-308.2, § 18.2-53.1 or § 18.2-308.4 case? Each has its own sheet; this one covers carrying, brandishing and school property.
- For concealed carry: the item is on the § 18.2-308 enumerated list
- Concealment established, including the deceptive-appearance gloss
- Prior convictions checked — INCLUDING substantially similar local ordinances
- § 18.2-308 exceptions and permit scheme read directly
- For brandishing: the manner, and objectively reasonable fear
- Self-defence considered — it is an express carve-out
- School proximity measured if the Class 6 brandishing enhancement is charged
- For school property: which subsection — A, B, or C
- Blade measured against the under-three-inch folding pocket-knife carve-out
- If subsection C: the five-year mandatory minimum, served consecutively
7. Annotated Authority
Annotated authority — research layer, not printed on the PDF
Montgomery v. Commonwealth 98 Va. 840, 841-44, 36 S.E. 371, 372-73, Va., 1900
A landowner may not meet a MERE TRESPASSER with a deadly weapon — and in Montgomery it was the landowner's brandishing of a sharpened corn-cutter that PROVOKED the defendant's assertion of self-defence.
Practical value: The historical root of Alexander. Note the sting: the person who produces the weapon over property can end up as the aggressor, handing the other side a self-defence claim.
Sutherland v. Commonwealth 109 Va. 834, 835, 65 S.E. 15, Va., 1909
The source of the "ABOUT HIS PERSON" test, and it is a case the Commonwealth LOST. A pistol in a scabbard inside closed saddle-bags CARRIED IN THE HAND was not carried "about his person". The Court applied strict construction: a penal statute "must be construed STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE and favorably to the liberty of the citizen", there "can be NO CONSTRUCTIVE OFFENSES", and "before a man can be punished his case must be PLAINLY AND UNMISTAKABLY WITHIN THE STATUTE."
Practical value: A century old and still the governing frame. Anything the defendant is CARRYING rather than WEARING invites this argument — bags, cases, containers. Strict construction is the defence's strongest general tool on this statute.
Commonwealth v. Alexander Rec. No. 991786 (Va. 9 June 2000), Va., 2000
A DEADLY WEAPON MAY NOT BE BRANDISHED SOLELY IN DEFENCE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. The Court of Appeals had held the trial court erred in refusing instructions to that effect; the Supreme Court REVERSED the Court of Appeals, entered final judgment REINSTATING the circuit court's sentencing order, and remanded for its enforcement.
Practical value: The answer to "he was protecting his property". There is no such defence to § 18.2-282 where property alone is at stake — and per Montgomery, producing the weapon may make your defendant the aggressor.
Morris v. Commonwealth Rec. No. 032714 (Va. 14 Jan. 2005), Va., 2005
Convictions AFFIRMED for possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 18.2-308.2) and brandishing (§ 18.2-282) where the object was a FLARE PISTOL. The trial judge found it "obviously . . . intended to be used as a weapon" and that from "the way [it] was used under the facts of this case" it could be inferred the defendant knew it had the characteristics bringing it within the statute. The judge could also treat testimony he concluded was perjured as AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE OF GUILT.
Practical value: Two useful points. A flare pistol can qualify, so do not concede that an unconventional object falls outside the statute. And a defendant who testifies falsely hands the fact finder affirmative evidence — worth remembering when deciding whether to impeach.
Farrakhan v. Commonwealth 273 Va. 177, 181-82, 639 S.E.2d 227, 229-30, Va., 2007
Defines "WEAPON OF LIKE KIND" in § 18.2-308(A), and NARROWS it. Because the offence "is 'possessory' in nature, IT IS COMMITTED UPON CONCEALMENT" — so "SUBSEQUENT USE OR CIRCUMSTANCES MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED in the definitional analysis of 'weapon.'" Strictly construing the statute: "in order to be a 'weapon' within the definition of 'weapon of like kind,' THE ITEM MUST BE DESIGNED FOR FIGHTING PURPOSES OR COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD TO BE A 'WEAPON.'" The Court illustrated with the letter opener resembling a dirk, and the knife bought in a restaurant.
Practical value: THE CRITICAL LIMIT, and it cuts against the Commonwealth. How the object was USED is irrelevant to whether it is a weapon — a kitchen knife does not become one because it was used in a robbery. Ask first whether the item is designed for fighting or commonly understood to be a weapon; if not, § 18.2-308(A) does not reach it however alarming the conduct.
Pruitt v. Commonwealth Rec. No. 061701 (Va. 14 Sept. 2007), Va., 2007
REVERSED, CONVICTION VACATED, INDICTMENT DISMISSED. After a collision Pruitt retrieved his pistol from the floor, placed it in the console compartment between the front seats, and IMMEDIATELY EXITED the vehicle. Held: at no time while the pistol was concealed in the console was it "ABOUT [HIS] PERSON", because it was not so placed as to afford "PROMPT AND IMMEDIATE USE."
Practical value: The charge-killer on a vehicle stop. Concealment alone is not enough — the weapon must have been readily accessible to the defendant at the moment it was concealed. A gun in a console while the defendant is OUTSIDE the car is not "about his person".
Viney v. Commonwealth 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28, Va., 2005
The sufficiency standard Pruitt applied: the facts are viewed in the light most favourable to the Commonwealth with all reasonable inferences in its favour, and the judgment "will be reversed only upon a showing that it is PLAINLY WRONG OR WITHOUT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT" (Code § 8.01-680).
Practical value: Note that even under this deferential standard the Commonwealth LOST Pruitt — the defect there was legal, not evidentiary. ⚠️ Viney is ALSO annotated on the indecent-liberties sheet, for its lascivious-intent holding. And VINEY is 269 Va. 296 while RINER is 268 Va. 296 — same page, previous volume.
Pritchett v. Commonwealth 219 Va. 927, 928-29, 252 S.E.2d 352, 353, Va., 1979
The general Virginia definition of a DEADLY WEAPON — an instrument "likely to, or which will, cause or produce death or great bodily harm WHEN USED IN THE MANNER CONTEMPLATED BY ITS DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION" — and unless a weapon is deadly PER SE, whether it is deadly "DEPENDS MORE ON THE MANNER IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN USED THAN ON ITS INTRINSIC CHARACTER", a question for the fact finder.
Practical value: ⚠️ NOTE THE TENSION WITH FARRAKHAN, which is the most important thing on this sheet. For BRANDISHING under § 18.2-282 and for deadly-weapon grading, manner of use matters (Pritchett). For CONCEALED CARRY under § 18.2-308(A), Farrakhan holds that subsequent use may NOT be considered — the item must be designed for fighting or commonly understood to be a weapon. Do not import Pritchett's manner-of-use test into a concealed-weapon charge. ⚠️ Pritchett is a STATUTORY BURGLARY case under § 18.2-91. The two annotations that formerly cited it on this sheet — brandishing as a lesser-included offence — were fabricated and were removed.
McCoy v. Commonwealth 125 Va. 771, 775, 99 S.E. 644, 645, Va., 1919
Where self-defence is JUSTIFIABLE the defendant "NEED NOT RETREAT, but is permitted to STAND HIS GROUND and repel the attack by force, INCLUDING DEADLY FORCE, if it is necessary."
Practical value: The no-retreat rule applies only to JUSTIFIABLE self-defence — the defendant completely without fault. Establish fault first; it decides whether retreat was required.
Perkins v. Commonwealth 186 Va. 867, 876, 44 S.E.2d 426, 430, Va., 1947
"JUSTIFIABLE self-defense arises when the defendant is COMPLETELY WITHOUT FAULT" — as distinct from EXCUSABLE self-defence, where the defendant is at some fault in bringing on the difficulty.
Practical value: The distinction that decides brandishing and firearm cases pleaded as self-defence. A defendant partly at fault is not thereby out of the defence, but he must have retreated as far as safely possible and abandoned the fight.
Foote v. Commonwealth 11 Va. App. 61, 67-69, 396 S.E.2d 851, 855-56, Va. Ct. App., 1990
CONVICTIONS REVERSED for attempted murder and use of a firearm, the self-defence claim being sufficient. Two propositions carry it: "a person has THE RIGHT TO RESIST AN UNLAWFUL ARREST", and the reasonableness of the force used is governed by the ordinary rules of self-defence — JUSTIFIABLE where the defendant is completely without fault, EXCUSABLE where he is not.
Practical value: The defence the sheet must anticipate. Where the encounter began with an arrest the defendant was entitled to resist, a brandishing or firearm charge can fail entirely — so establish the lawfulness of the arrest before charging.
Holloman v. Commonwealth 221 Va. 196, 197-99, 269 S.E.2d 356, 357-58, Va., 1980
Conviction AFFIRMED under § 18.2-53.1. The object was a SPRING-POWERED BB PISTOL that fired BBs "by the force of a spring, NOT BY GUNPOWDER", but appeared in size, weight and shape to be a .45 automatic. Held: the evidence sufficed "upon proof that defendant employed an instrument which GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF HAVING A FIRING CAPABILITY, WHETHER OR NOT the object actually had the capacity to propel a bullet by the force of gunpowder."
Practical value: For § 18.2-53.1, appearance is enough — a replica or BB gun qualifies. ⚠️ DO NOT CARRY THIS ACROSS TO § 18.2-308.2:2. That section DEFINES "firearm" by "an explosion of a combustible material", which a spring-driven BB pistol does not satisfy. Holloman construes § 18.2-53.1, which contains NO definition — the Court said so expressly. This is the same distinction corrected on the robbery sheet.
Main v. Commonwealth 20 Va. App. 370, 371-73, 457 S.E.2d 400, 401-02, Va. Ct. App. (en banc), 1995
AFFIRMED on rehearing en banc. "[C]arrying a weapon in one's back pocket, COVERED BY A DUFFLE BAG, constitutes carrying a concealed weapon IF THE HANDLE of the weapon, THE ONLY PART OF THE WEAPON EXTENDING OUTSIDE OF THE POCKET, IS CONCEALED BY THE DUFFLE BAG." A weapon is "hidden from common observation WHEN IT IS OBSERVABLE BUT IS OF SUCH DECEPTIVE APPEARANCE AS TO DISGUISE THE WEAPON'S TRUE NATURE", and here it was "HIDDEN FROM ALL EXCEPT THOSE WITH AN UNUSUAL OR EXCEPTIONAL OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW IT" — the officer saw the handle only after whirling the defendant around.
Practical value: The concealment case, and the standard is far easier for the Commonwealth than it looks: PARTIAL VISIBILITY IS STILL CONCEALMENT. What matters is not whether the weapon could be seen from some angle but whether ordinary observation would reveal it. ⚠️ DO NOT CITE 19 Va. App. 272, 450 S.E.2d 772 (1994). That is the PANEL decision in the same case, and the en banc court SUPERSEDED IT — the three dissenters here would have reversed "for the reasons more fully stated in the majority opinion" at 19 Va. App. 272. The panel opinion is the one that lets the defendant WIN. Cite 20 Va. App. 370, en banc.
O'Banion v. Commonwealth Record No. 2698-97-4 (Va. Ct. App. July 25, 2000) (en banc), Va. Ct. App. (en banc), 2000
A BOX-CUTTER IS A "RAZOR" within § 18.2-308(A), so a felon carrying one concealed violates § 18.2-308.2. The Code "does not absolutely prohibit a felon from carrying a knife, but PROSCRIBES SPECIFIC KINDS OF KNIVES AND THOSE OF LIKE KIND", and the general words are limited by EJUSDEM GENERIS and NOSCITUR A SOCIIS. A razor is "a KEEN-EDGED CUTTING INSTRUMENT"; the box-cutter "combines the FINE-EDGED SHARPNESS OF A STRAIGHT RAZOR with the RETRACTING CAPACITY OF A LOCKED-BLADE KNIFE." The court expressly did not reach whether the steak knife also qualified.
Practical value: The working method for any object not on the statutory list: name the enumerated item it most resembles, then show it shares that item's defining characteristic. Charge the box-cutter, not the kitchen knife. ⚠️ UNPUBLISHED — no reporter citation, and under Rule 5A:1(f) it is citable but not binding. O'Banion also REVERSES a trespass conviction for refusal of a claim-of-right instruction; that half belongs to the trespass sheet.
Martin v. Commonwealth 224 Va. 298, 301-02, 295 S.E.2d 890, 892-93, Va., 1982
THE LIMIT AGAINST THE COMMONWEALTH, and the case that stops § 18.2-308(A) from swallowing every sharp object: A POCKET-KNIFE IS NEITHER A DIRK, BOWIE KNIFE, SWITCHBLADE KNIFE, BALLISTIC KNIFE, NOR A WEAPON OF LIKE KIND within the meaning of the section. The statutory-construction rules follow: under EJUSDEM GENERIS, "when a particular class of persons or things is enumerated in a statute and general words follow, THE GENERAL WORDS ARE TO BE RESTRICTED IN THEIR MEANING to a sense analogous to the less general, particular words"; under NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, general words grouped with specific ones "will be construed to embrace ONLY OBJECTS SIMILAR IN NATURE to those things identified by the specific words."
Practical value: Screen the file against this before charging. An ordinary folding pocket-knife is not within the section however the officer described it, and Martin is the Supreme Court saying so. ⚠️ NAME COLLISION — this is NOT Martin, 184 Va. 1009, the homicide case, and NOT Martinez, 42 Va. App. 9, which also sits on the homicide sheet. Three different cases, three different propositions.
Wood ex rel. Wood v. Henry County Public Schools 255 Va. 85, 94-95, 495 S.E.2d 255, 260-61, Va., 1998
The Supreme Court's instruction that EJUSDEM GENERIS and NOSCITUR A SOCIIS are the rules to apply when deciding whether an object falls within the definition of a "weapon" as that word is used in Code § 18.2-308(A). It also supplies the dictionary definitions the courts use for the enumerated items — a BOWIE KNIFE is "a large hunting knife adapted [especially] for KNIFE-FIGHTING . . . having a guarded handle and a strong single-edge blade typically 10 to 15 inches long"; a SWITCHBLADE is "a pocketknife having the blade spring-operated so that pressure on a release catch causes it to fly open."
Practical value: Note what the bowie-knife definition assumes — a knife ADAPTED FOR FIGHTING. That is the same idea Farrakhan applies to concealed carry generally, and it is why kitchen and utility knives keep falling outside the section. ⚠️ READ THE CAPTION: Wood is a CIVIL CASE — a school-expulsion challenge, not a prosecution — and it reaches this sheet only for its construction of § 18.2-308(A). ⚠️ NAME COLLISION: it is NOT Wood, 149 Va. 401, on the assault-battery sheet, and this corpus also carries Woods, 66 Va. App. 123, and Woodard, 27 Va. App. 405.
Richards v. Commonwealth 18 Va. App. 242, 246 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 177, 179 n.2, Va. Ct. App., 1994
Defines the first item on the statutory list: "A 'DIRK' OR WEAPON OF LIKE KIND IS ANY STABBING WEAPON HAVING TWO SHARP EDGES AND A POINT, including daggers, short swords and stilettos."
Practical value: Two sharp edges AND a point — a single-edged blade is not a dirk, whatever it is called on the property sheet. Measure the knife before the preliminary hearing.
Ricks v. Commonwealth 27 Va. App. 442, 444, 499 S.E.2d 575, 576, Va. Ct. App., 1998
The Code "DOES NOT ABSOLUTELY PROHIBIT A FELON FROM CARRYING A KNIFE, but proscribes SPECIFIC KINDS of knives and those OF LIKE KIND."
Practical value: The sentence to have ready when the theory is "he is a felon and he had a knife". That is not an offence. Identify the kind of knife, or there is no case.
Jones v. Commonwealth 16 Va. App. 354, 357, 429 S.E.2d 615, 616, Va. Ct. App., 1993
THE RULE THAT SORTS THE WHOLE FIREARM-DEFINITION MESS. Whether a term undefined by statute takes its traditional meaning or a more expansive one "DEPENDS UPON THE PURPOSE AND POLICY UNDERLYING THE PARTICULAR STATUTE." Where a statute is designed to deter a broad range of conduct producing APPREHENSION OF PHYSICAL HARM in others, the expansive definition applies; but "WHEN A STATUTE IS DESIGNED ONLY TO PROSCRIBE THE ACT OF POSSESSING A FIREARM or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, A NARROWER, MORE TRADITIONAL DEFINITION" is required.
Practical value: This is the fence between Holloman and § 18.2-308.2:2, stated by the court itself rather than inferred. Holloman's appearance-is-enough rule belongs to § 18.2-53.1, a DETERRENCE statute; a bare POSSESSION statute gets the traditional definition. Ask what the section is for before deciding what "firearm" means in it.
Timmons v. Commonwealth 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897, Va. Ct. App., 1992
Jones's rule applied: a statute proscribing POSSESSION OF A "FIREARM" WHILE IN POSSESSION OF COCAINE "DOES NOT INCLUDE OBJECTS THAT MERELY APPEAR TO HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF FIRING WHEN, IN FACT, THEY DO NOT."
Practical value: The concrete answer to carrying Holloman across. A replica, a non-functioning gun or a spring-driven BB pistol may support § 18.2-53.1 and still fail a possession charge. Have the firearm examined.